How “Commerce Among the Several States” Became “Interstate Commerce,” and Why It Matters by Weiler, Conrad J., Jr.




How “Commerce Among the Several States”
Became “Interstate Commerce,” and Why It
Matters
Conrad J. Weiler Jr.
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Constitutional
Commentary collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Weiler, Conrad J. Jr., "How “Commerce Among the Several States” Became “Interstate Commerce,” and Why It Matters" (2019).
Constitutional Commentary. 1193.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm/1193
4 - WEILER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/11/19 6:28 PM 
 
329 
HOW “COMMERCE AMONG THE SEVERAL 
STATES” BECAME “INTERSTATE 
COMMERCE,” AND WHY IT MATTERS 
Conrad J. Weiler, Jr.* 
INTRODUCTION 
A. OUTLINE 
This Introduction briefly discusses the significance of the 
Constitutional “[p]ower . . . [t]o regulate [c]ommerce . . . among 
the several states” and argues that this, the actual language of the 
Constitution, was understood to have and has a broader meaning 
than the nearly universally accepted but quite unoriginal 
substitute language, “interstate commerce.” Part I considers the 
first major interpretation of the actual words of the Constitution, 
in Gibbons v. Ogden,1 and then discusses the origins and meanings 
of the later invented and adopted terms “interstate” and 
“intrastate.” Part II presents data on the frequency of usage of all 
these terms in all Court majority opinions since 1789, and shows 
how “interstate commerce” has overwhelmingly been the term 
used by the Supreme Court since shortly after its introduction in 
1869, being used about ten times more in majority opinions 
concerning the power to regulate commerce among the several 
states since roughly 1910 than the actual constitutional language. 
 
 * Associate Professor Emeritus, Department of Political Science, Temple 
University. The author is indebted to (now) Dr. Matthew Smetona of Temple University 
for very helpful early research assistance, to the late Dr. David Adamany, Esq., Stephanie 
Kosta, Esq., and Prof. Jeffrey Dunoff of the Beasley School of Law for assistance and to 
the Department of Political Science and Temple University for support and time for this 
research. Earlier versions of this paper were presented to the Pennsylvania Political 
Science Association in 2012, the Midwest Political Science Association Convention in 2015 
and were uploaded to SSRN. Comments from Prof. John Kincaid, Director of the Meyner 
Center at Lafayette College, Lauren Rowlands, ABD, and members of the Temple 
Political Science faculty and graduate student association, and significant editorial advice 
from Prof. Jill Hasday were also very helpful, though the author is obviously solely 
responsible for the content of the article. 
 1. 22 U.S. 1 (1824). 
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Part III presents the research methodology. Part IV first analyses 
key Court opinions over the last century, including modern 
originalist analyses, to show how the use of “interstate commerce” 
has led or allowed the Court to take what is arguably a narrower 
view of the power than is warranted by the actual language of the 
Constitution, in turn necessitating greater than necessary resort to 
commerce power-extending doctrines such as the affecting 
commerce test and the necessary and proper clause. Then it 
considers past and modern academic analyses of the power over 
commerce based on the “interstate commerce” gloss, including 
several contemporary analyses that present themselves as 
originalist. Part VI discusses the dangers of reliance on commerce 
power-extending doctrines resulting from dependence on the 
“interstate commerce” power. Part VII is a brief conclusion. 
B. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE POWER TO REGULATE 
COMMERCE AMONG THE SEVERAL STATES AND ITS 
DEFINITION 
The potential significance of this study stems first from the 
fact that giving the national government a power to regulate 
commerce was among the most important reasons for creating the 
Constitution in the first place, and has remained among its most 
important powers. Second, beginning with the so-called Interstate 
Commerce Act of 1887,2 and especially since the New Deal, the 
power to regulate commerce among the several states has become 
the main source of numerous federal regulations governing wide 
aspects of American life, from regulating civil rights in the private 
sector for minorities, women, the disabled, the elderly and other 
groups in employment, housing, protecting the environment, 
including air, soil, wetlands, water and endangered species, as well 
as workplace safety, financial regulation, regulating much of 
health care, fighting organized crime, regulating harmful as well 
as helpful drugs, and protecting food, product and consumer 
safety, among others. Third, conservatives and some originalists 
have argued that the “interstate commerce” power is not strong 
enough to support this legislation and is too broadly construed. 
Thus, because of the importance of the power to regulate 
commerce among the states for American domestic policy, the 
 
 2. This is the popular name of the act, not the official title, which to some extent 
demonstrates our point. See infra pp. 441, 453–55, 457–58, 486, and accompanying notes, 
and notes 44 and 64.  
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interpretation of the meaning of each of the words of the power—
and especially of a gloss like “interstate commerce” is very 
important to constitutional law and to society generally. 
Over the years, the Court has developed three main 
approaches to the power over commerce among the states, one 
dealing with instrumentalities and channels of commerce, another 
dealing with persons and things in commerce, and a third dealing 
with activities affecting commerce.3 Within those categories this 
article focuses only on the question of whether and to what extent 
the use of the actual language of the Constitution—“among the 
several states” versus the neologisms “interstate” and 
“intrastate”—affects the perception or definition of the actual 
extent of the power within the last category, things affecting 
commerce. 
On the one hand, this article argues that generally the 
“interstate commerce power” is itself seen narrowly as limited to 
regulation of commerce—however defined4—that is in the 
process of crossing state boundaries only, and thus the power 
often needs considerable assistance from various commerce-
extending doctrines if it is going to reach activity inside states. 
This extension of the Constitutional gloss has long been criticized, 
especially by modern conservative originalists. On the other hand, 
I argue that the power actually in the Constitution, to regulate 
commerce among the several states, by definition can regulate 
certain activity inside states, particularly activity that is not 
directly in the process of crossing state lines, as long as it affects 
more states than one, thus reaching a potentially wider range of 
activities without need or as much need of the assistance of 
extending doctrines and reaching even further with the aid of such 
doctrines. While the latter is a highly disputed issue which for 
space reasons we cannot deal with fully, this article argues that the 
 
 3. Chief Justice Rehnquist well summarized most of this doctrine in United States 
v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552–60 (1995), though he did so entirely within the linguistic 
framework of “interstate commerce.” See infra, pp. 461–63.  
 4. Though the meaning of individual words of the power are contested, they could 
be somewhat interdependent in their effects. A broad interpretation of the terms 
“regulate” or “commerce,” for example, could counter to some extent the effect of a 
narrow interpretation of “among the several states,” and vice versa. Along these lines 
Balkin argues that restrictions on the meaning of “commerce” are sometimes actually 
restrictions on “among.” JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, 181–82 (2011). For 
limited discussion of the definition of “commerce” see infra pp. 433, 456–57, 459–461, 464–
65, 468–71, and 482–85, and notes 13, 17, 95. 
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dominance of “interstate commerce” over the actual 
constitutional language has supported a narrower than justified 
meaning of the power over commerce among the several states, 
including supporting the narrow meaning argued by some 
conservative and originalist Justices and academicians. 
I. THE ORIGINS OF THE WORDS OF THE 
CONSTITUTION AND THEIR SUBSTITUTES 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
As the data in Part III demonstrate, the actual constitutional 
language “commerce . . . among the several states” has long been 
largely supplanted on the Court by the phrase “interstate 
commerce,” and the latter has long been normally used generally 
in law and society to refer to the power over commerce among the 
several states on the largely unexamined assumption that the two 
are the same. In this section we explore the origins and meanings 
of the original language of the Constitution and of the term 
“interstate commerce,” as well as its reinforcing complement 
“intrastate.” Because of space considerations, we cannot fully 
examine the debate over the origins or meaning of “among the 
several states,” but merely sketch out two basic contrasting 
contentions as to the meaning, and then examine these 
contentions in light of our data. 
B. “AMONG THE SEVERAL STATES” 
Gaining a power to regulate foreign commerce was one of 
the chief motives for the calling of the Constitutional Convention, 
as its absence from the Articles of Confederation proved to be a 
major weakness for the new nation. This power was granted in 
Convention with little or no controversy over the power itself, but 
extensive controversy prevailed over whether it would be 
exercised by a two-thirds or a simple majority. The chief 
opposition to a simple majority was from Southern delegates who 
feared that it would allow a Northern majority to burden their 
slave-labor-based exports as well as perhaps squeeze out slavery 
itself. The issue was resolved when concessions were made to the 
South over slavery, though some continued to advocate for the 
supermajority requirement both in Convention and then later in 
some Southern ratifying conventions. The power over commerce 
among the several states was recognized as necessary in itself as 
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well as to complement the power over foreign commerce and thus 
was added, again with little controversy over the power itself, but 
with considerable controversy over the size of the majority to 
exercise it. A power over Indian commerce was already in the 
Articles of Confederation and was brought forward into the 
Constitution with no debate, but with simplified language.5 
As noted above, the power over commerce among the 
several states is among the most important as well as contested 
powers in the Constitution. Briefly, the key debates are over 
whether the power to regulate includes the power to prohibit, 
whether commerce is only buying and selling or something 
broader, perhaps as broad as all productive or gainful activity, 
whether the three parts of the power have the same extent, and 
regarding the part we are concerned with here, “among the 
several states,” the debate, in sum, concerns whether this phrase 
purports to extend federal power to some activities inside states 
or is more narrowly limited only to activities which cross state 
boundaries. 
This latter debate originated in differing political views of the 
appropriate scope of the power over commerce among the states, 
but also in occasional usage of the term “between the states” in 
the Framing era, a term which actually conveys the narrower 
meaning of only covering activities crossing state boundaries. In 
the early Republic, the narrow “between” meaning of “among” 
was often advocated by those in favor of states’ rights and a 
weaker federal power, often in the defense of state control over 
slavery as an internal matter, since the national power over 
commerce was recognized as perhaps the chief danger to the 
peculiar institution.6 However, the meaning of “among the several 
states” was not considered in detail by the Supreme Court until 
the foundational 1824 case, Gibbons v. Ogden, which ironically 
had nothing to do with slavery. 
C. GIBBONS V. OGDEN 
Gibbons v. Ogden concerned a long-disputed New York state 
monopoly of the business of ferrying passengers by steamboat 
across the Hudson River between Manhattan and northern New 
 
 5. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IX, § 4. 
 6. DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE SLAVEHOLDING REPUBLIC, 43 (2001) and 1 
WILLIAM WINSLOW CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION 47, 281 (1953), 
among others.  
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Jersey granted to Ogden.7 Gibbons, on the other hand, had a 
federal coasting license under the federal Coasting Act of 1793, 
and claimed that this gave him the right to also operate a ferry 
between Manhattan and New Jersey regardless of the New York 
monopoly. Among other arguments, Ogden’s counsel asserted 
that the power over commerce among the several states extended 
to commerce only when it crossed a state line, while activity inside 
a state was left to the state to regulate, and he often characterized 
the power as “between” the states.8 This “between” interpretation 
was an early version of the “interstate” theory that is our central 
concern. 
In striking down the New York monopoly because it 
conflicted with the federal coasting license, Marshall directly 
addressed the meaning of “among” in the phrase, “commerce 
among the several states.” Marshall made quite clear that the 
word “among” meant to go inside states: “The word “among” 
means intermingled with. A thing which is among others, is 
intermingled with them. Commerce among the States, cannot stop 
at the external boundary line of each State, but may be introduced 
into the interior.”9 
In direct rebuttal to Ogden’s “between” meaning of 
“among,” Marshall made clear that the state line was not the limit 
of the power of Congress:  
But, in regulating commerce with foreign nations, the power of 
Congress does not stop at the jurisdictional lines of the several 
States. . . . This principle is, if possible, still more clear, when 
applied to commerce “among the several States.” They either 
join each other, in which case they are separated by a 
mathematical line, or they are remote from each other, in 
 
 7. 22 U.S. 1 (1824). For historical background see HERBERT A. JOHNSON, GIBBONS 
v. OGDEN: JOHN MARSHALL, STEAMBOATS, AND THE COMMERCE CLAUSE (2010) 
[hereinafter JOHNSON, GIBBONS], and THOMAS H. COX, GIBBONS V. OGDEN, LAW AND 
SOCIETY IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC (2009). Ironically, the preface to each book 
anachronistically describes the case as dealing with “interstate commerce,” which 
demonstrates our thesis by linguistically assuming away much of the point of Marshall’s 
opinion. COX, supra, at ix; JOHNSON, GIBBONS, supra, at xiii and infra note 13. 
 8. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 64–65. 
 9. Marshall both went beyond and largely ignored much of what the parties argued. 
Marshall gave no attention to the extensive discussion by the parties of the intellectual 
property clause, and bypassed whether the federal power was exclusive or concurrent, 
though Justice Johnson’s concurrence did address the latter. Nor did the parties spend 
much time addressing the meaning of “among” or “several states,” which Marshall 
obviously did. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 194–96 (emphasis added). Concerning “mingle,” see 
infra, pp. 434–36, 459, 461, 462, 464, 468–69, 470, 473, 480, 490, 492, and note 13. 
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which case other States lie between them. What is commerce 
“among” them; and how is it to be conducted? Can a trading 
expedition between two adjoining States, commence and 
terminate outside of each? And if the trading intercourse be 
between two States remote from each other, must it not 
commence in one, terminate in the other, and probably pass 
through a third? Commerce among the States must, of 
necessity, be commerce with the States.10 
To be sure, as Marshall continued, the power to go inside a 
state would not grant federal power over “the purely internal 
commerce of a state,” but it would extend to “that commerce 
which affects more states than one,” i.e, “several.” (emphasis 
added).11 
Neither of the parties nor Marshall cited any dictionaries in 
the case. However, Marshall’s definition of “among” and his 
contrast of its meaning with that argued by Ogden corresponds 
very closely to definitions in Dr. Samuel Johnson’s Dictionary of 
the English Language.12 Johnson first defined “between” as “[i]n 
the intermediate space,” or “[f]rom one to another; noting 
intercourse.” He listed several other definitions and then at the 
end importantly said “[b]etween is properly used of two and 
among of more; but perhaps this accuracy is not always observed.” 
For “among” Johnson’s first definition was: “[m]ingled with; 
placed with other persons or things; on every side.” “Mingle” 
(from which “mingled” derives), he first defined as: “[t]o mix; to 
join; to compound; to unite with something so as to make one 
 
 10. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 193–94 (emphasis added). See infra note 13 on Marshall’s use 
of the term “intercourse” and supra note 4. 
 11. By referring to “commerce which affects more states than one” Marshall 
arguably was not introducing the “affecting commerce” test per se, but referring to the 
“several states” part of the power, the term “several” requiring by definition that the 
commerce in question be among or inside more states than one. The “inside” meaning of 
“among” necessitates the term “several” to avoid regulating commerce inside only one 
state. In contrast, if the Constitution meant or said “between the several states,” as many 
have argued, (see infra, pp. 466–68 and 482–485) by definition “between” requires at least 
two states, making “several” redundant. 
 12. SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1755) 
[hereinafter JOHNSON, DICTIONARY]. Here we partially follow the practice of originalists 
on and off the Court who increasingly (though sometimes unsystematically) have cited 
early dictionaries for constitutional meaning, preeminently Dr. Johnson’s Dictionary. See 
James J. Brudney & Lawrence Baum, Oasis or Mirage: The Court’s Thirst for Dictionaries 
in the Rehnquist and Roberts Eras, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 483 (2013), and Jeffrey L. 
Kirchmeier & Samuel A. Thumma, Scaling the Lexicon Fortress: The United States 
Supreme Court’s Use of Dictionaries in the Twenty-First Century, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 77 
(2010). 
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mass,” and the second definition was “[c]onjoined with others, so 
as to make part of the number,” all of which seem to mean being 
inside of or a part of something. But regarding Johnson’s point at 
the end of his definition of “between,” that the “accuracy” 
between the two definitions was not always observed, his own 
definitions of “between” and “among” themselves do differ 
meaningfully. His definition of “between,” “[i]n the intermediate 
space” clearly denotes being outside of whatever occupies the 
spaces or entities that one is between, such as on a state boundary, 
and “from one to another” similarly conveys the meaning of 
crossing from one clearly defined unit to another across a 
boundary. On the other hand, his definitions of “among,” i.e., 
“mingled with,” and especially “conjoined with others so as to 
make part of the number,” or “one mass” clearly emphasize a very 
different meaning of being inside of or part of a larger number or 
whole.13 
We recognize that our interpretation of Gibbons is disputed, 
and we readily concede as noted below in Table 3 that the 
Framers and the early Court often used the term “between” in 
connection with “commerce among the several states,” which has 
supported arguments that the Framers understood “among” to 
actually mean only “between.”14 But, without fully exploring the 
debate, it must be noted that “between” can very comfortably be 
a lesser included meaning within the broad meaning of “among.” 
If one is going inside more states than one to regulate commerce, 
one usually also crosses state borders and thus goes “between” 
states in order to go “among” them. Moreover, much federal 
regulation of commerce does only concern commerce at the point 
of crossing a state boundary. So the term “between” in itself could 
well be or have been the precise term appropriate to describe the 
actual activity or regulation in question in any given situation of 
 
 13. JOHNSON, DICTIONARY, supra note 12, (emphasis added), “between,” “mingle,” 
and “among.” Note that Marshall’s use of “intercourse” in the passage quoted above is 
also Dr. Johnson’s first definition of “commerce:” “[i]ntercourse; exchange of one thing 
for another; interchange of any thing; trade; traffick.” Some modern conservative 
originalists skip over “intercourse.” See infra notes 113 and 114. 
 14. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 
CHI. L. REV., 101, 132–39 (2001) [hereinafter Original Meaning]; RANDY E. BARNETT, 
RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 301–02 (2004) 
[hereinafter RESTORING], among others. While Barnett consulted Dr. Johnson’s 
Dictionary regarding “commerce,” he did not for “among,” concluding on other grounds 
that “among” must mean “between.” Original Meaning, 132–36. See, infra notes 144, 145, 
and 168. 
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being “in the intermediate space,” i.e., crossing a state boundary, 
though crucially not defining the full reach of “among” in terms 
of commerce inside of and affecting more states than one. In other 
words, “between” is arguably a conception, or specific expected 
application, but not the concept or full meaning of “among.”15 In 
any event, though a full discussion is beyond the scope of this 
article, we believe that there is ample additional originalist 
evidence16 as well as Marshall’s opinion in Gibbons to support the 
“inside” meaning of “among,” in contrast to the “crossing a state 
line” or “between” meaning, and in contrast to the meaning of the 
yet-to-be invented term that would eventually dominate the 
entire topic, “interstate.”17 
Within a few years of Gibbons, under new Chief Justice 
Taney the Court began embracing views that, while not directly 
repudiating the “inside” meaning of “among,” greatly limited the 
ability of the Federal government to reach insides states under the 
power over commerce. In three cases, Mayor of New York v. 
Miln,18 the License Cases,19 and the Passenger Cases,20 the Court 
found that transportation of persons into a state was not 
commerce and was instead completely subject to the internal 
police powers of the states over public health and welfare. (To be 
sure, the Court recognized that the navigable waterways of the 
United States themselves were partial exceptions to the 
“between” limitation, so that commerce could be regulated inside 
a state to the extent it was “navigation” to the port). Besides 
excluding persons (once on land) from the federal regulation of 
commerce, for presumably pro-slavery reasons, these opinions 
took a very strong stand to try to exclude any conflict between 
state police laws and federal commerce regulation, distinguishing 
between what went between states and what went inside, so that 
it seemed that there was a sharp and clear demarcation between 
the two. In what has come to be called a “dual federalism” 
 
 15. Ronald Dworkin, Comment, in A MATTER of INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL 
COURTS AND THE LAW 119 (Antonin Scalia ed., 1997). 
 16. See infra pp. 476–79 and 482–83 for limited discussion. 
 17. As mentioned supra note 4, giving a broad meaning to one part of the power 
could compensate for a narrow reading of another, and vice versa; consequently Marshall’s 
broad definition of commerce as “intercourse” in Gibbons would also likely extend the 
power inside states, though here our focus is upon “among” versus “interstate.” See supra 
note 15. 
 18. 36 U.S. 102 (1837). 
 19. 46 U.S. 504 (1847). 
 20. 48 U.S. 283 (1849). 
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interpretation,21 the Taney Court seemed to say that if a state 
were exerting its police powers inside itself, regardless of effects 
on commerce among the states, i.e., on that commerce which the 
federal government could otherwise regulate, there could be no 
federal regulation. Thus under Taney the reach of the federal 
power over commerce among the states was largely limited to that 
which was “between” or was crossing state boundaries,22 and 
while the Taney Court did not explicitly repudiate the “inside” or 
“intermingled” meaning of “among” or explicitly adopt the 
“between” meaning, it adopted doctrines that largely 
accomplished this result. 
After the Civil War, these narrow commerce doctrines 
survived, though obviously no longer in the service of slavery,23 
but instead in the service of an emerging “laissez-faire” outlook 
on the Court, where they soon found perfect expression in two 
recently invented terms: “interstate commerce” and “intrastate 
commerce.” 
D. INTERSTATE AND INTRASTATE COMMERCE 
1. Original Meaning and Use of “Interstate” Commerce 
The neologism “interstate” was apparently invented in the 
1840’s, but first appeared in a Supreme Court majority opinion 
paired with the word “commerce” in 1869. According to the 
Oxford English Dictionary (OED), the first meaning of 
“interstate” is: “(l)ying, extending, or carried on between 
independent states, or between states belonging to a Union, 
Federation, etc. Also as n., a road between states.”24 The OED’s 
first source is none other than the eminent Justice Joseph Story, 
who supposedly first used the term in his posthumous 1846 
 
 21. EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE COMMERCE POWER VERSUS THE STATES: “BACK 
TO THE CONSTITUTION” 141, 257 (Peter Smith, 1962) (1936). JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN, 
CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN FEDERALISM: THE GROWTH OF NATIONAL POWER, 70, 
90–93 (1992). To be clear, Taney did not himself use the later invented term “dual 
federalism.” 
 22. Of course, political divisions in the country also limited attempts of Congress to 
extend federal power. 
 23. Though they quite importantly did continue to support Jim Crow laws. See infra 
p. 135. 
 24. Interstate, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989) (emphasis added). 
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Miscellaneous Writings.25 The OED’s source for Story as the first 
user is Joseph E. Worcester’s 1860 Dictionary of the English 
Language.26 However, Worcester simply says the source is Story 
without providing what Story actually said, that the word is 
composed of “inter” and “state,” derives from the field of law, and 
means “existing between different states.”27 Without the actual 
quotation from Story it is difficult to know precisely what he 
meant by “interstate,” especially in the context of the power to 
regulate commerce among the states. The OED’s second source 
is J. M. Ludlow’s A Sketch of the History of the United States, 
where he is quoted as saying “[t]he Supreme Court has exclusive 
jurisdiction in all questions of constitutional, international, and (if 
I may venture the term) interstate law.”28 This does not give much 
sense of how he understood the term relative to the between 
versus among debate. The OED’s third source is George 
Bancroft’s 1876 History of the United States of America.29 
Bancroft’s use was not clearly in the narrow sense of relating only 
to objects as they pass over a boundary between states: he 
referred to the privileges and immunities clause of the Articles of 
Confederation as granting “inter-state rights.”30 Clearly, the rights 
in question were based on the idea that citizens could move from 
state to state, but the rights obviously would also apply to a citizen 
inside a state, and were thus not limited only to the instant when 
citizens crossed state boundaries. 
We have, however, found a use of the term “inter-state” as 
early as 1841, in the arguments of counsel31 in the important 
slavery case Groves v. Slaughter,32 which concerned primarily 
whether Mississippi could ban the importation and sale of slaves 
 
 25. Despite diligent searching, however, the author has been unable to find the actual 
use of this term in this volume, so it is not clear how Story might have used the term.  
 26. JOSEPH E. WORCESTER, DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1860). 
 27. Id. at 771 (emphasis added). 
 28. OXFORD, supra note 24; J. M. LUDLOW, A SKETCH OF THE HISTORY OF THE 
UNITED STATES 36 (1862) 
 29. OXFORD, supra note 24; GEORGE BANCROFT, 6 HISTORY OF THE UNITED 
STATES 34 (1876). 
 30. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, Art. IV, § 1; OXFORD, supra note 24, at 
34–35. The hyphenated version of “interstate” seems to have disappeared from use in the 
1890’s and generally we use the modern version. Lexis generally retrieves both versions. 
However, searching in Word requires searching for each version separately. See infra pp. 
439–41, 457, and notes 36 and 64. 
 31. As discussed infra p. 451, Lexis search results before the 1950’s often include 
arguments of counsel. 
 32. 40 U.S. 449 (1841). 
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from other states. The term “inter-state” was used five times by 
Counsel Walker to refer to actual commerce in slaves between 
Mississippi and other states, though importantly not as a synonym 
for the federal power over commerce among the several states. In 
addition, the phrase “commerce between the states” was used 
throughout as a synonym for “inter-state,” reinforcing the 
interchangeability of both terms. Use of both terms was 
appropriate to the facts of the case since the issue was a state’s 
ability to prevent movement of slaves across its border from a 
neighboring state. This case is thus perhaps the earliest recorded 
instance of the use of the term “interstate” as well as to use it in 
the narrow “crossing a state border” meaning, though obviously 
the term did not catch on right away. Justice Story was on the 
Court and participated in Groves v. Slaughter, so perhaps that is 
where he first heard the term, then used it in his book in 1846, 
where it was noticed by Worcester. 
An 1869 case, Hinson v. Lott,33 used “inter-state” once in the 
published argument of counsel John A. Campbell.34 Hinson 
concerned whether the City of Mobile, Alabama, in taxing sales, 
auctions and other activities, violated the no state import or 
export tax clause,35 because some of the goods the city taxed came 
from other states. The case concerned relations between two 
states, so that use of “inter-state” was again quite appropriate.36 
The first actual use of the term “inter-state” in a majority 
Supreme Court opinion was in Woodruff v. Parham, decided 
November 8, 1869, the same day as Hinson. Justice Miller for the 
majority argued that the no import or export duty clause only 
applied to “foreign” imports and exports. He distinguished the 
earlier case of Almy v. California, saying in that case 
[t]he master of the ship Rattler was fined for violating this law, 
by refusing to affix a stamp to a bill of lading for gold shipped 
on board his vessel from San Francisco to New York. It seems 
to have escaped the attention of counsel on both sides, and of 
 
 33. 75 U.S. 148 (1869). 
 34. Appointed to the Court in 1853, Campbell resigned in 1861 to join the 
Confederacy, resuming the practice of law after the War. OXFORD COMPANION TO THE 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (KERMIT L. HALL ed., 1992), 116–17. 
 35. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2. 
 36. Campbell is quoted as saying “the State act regulated inter-state commerce.” 
Hinson, 75 U.S. at 150.  
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the Chief Justice who delivered the opinion, that the case was 
one of inter-state commerce.37 
In this usage Miller seemed to apply “inter-state” to 
commerce involving a ship that was clearly sailing from one state 
to another, rather than from abroad, so that in this case the 
“between” meaning of “inter-state” was quite appropriate, and 
Miller’s use of “interstate” was not purporting to describe the 
whole extent of the federal power. Campbell was a counsel in both 
Hinson and Woodruff, so Campbell’s use of “inter-state” in 
Hinson may have inspired the Court to use it in Woodruff. Miller 
used the term only once, though the dissent used it six times. 
After this first appearance in a majority opinion, the next two 
majority opinions to use “interstate commerce” similarly used it 
appropriately in the “between” sense corresponding to the actual 
facts of the case, which involved actual navigation across state 
lines, 38 or in-state water transport of goods intended for or from 
market out of state.39 The latter case was a little less clear, since 
the Court was actually describing “intercourse,” and found that 
internal navigation that was part of a larger movement of the 
goods across state lines was regulable, but called it “between.” 
Thus the first few opinions did not use “interstate” in an all-
encompassing sense but seemingly as a lesser included term 
within the broader meaning of “commerce among the several 
states.” 
After its introduction by the Court in 1869, the term 
“interstate commerce” rapidly became a Court and general public 
favorite, its initial use by the Court soon reinforced by the 1887 
passage of the correspondingly called Interstate Commerce Act.40 
Since then, as shown more fully below,41 “interstate” has displaced 
by far the Framers’ phrase “among the states” in Supreme Court 
usage, and in the legal academy as well, including, ironically, even 
in discussions of the “original meaning” or “original 
understanding” of the power to regulate commerce. 
 
 37. Woodruff v. Parham, 75 U.S. 123, 137 (1869).  
 38. St. Louis v. Wiggins Ferry Co., 78 U.S. 423, 431–32 (1870).  
 39. The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557, 564–66 (1870). 
 40. See supra p. 430 and note 2. 
 41. See infra Part II. 
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2. “Intrastate” 
A few decades after the Court adopted “interstate 
commerce” it adopted another neologism, “intrastate.” 
“Intrastate” was often followed by “commerce” and paired with 
but sharply contrasted with “interstate commerce” to emphasize 
commerce or activity not normally subject to regulation under the 
“interstate commerce” power but instead left with the state.42 The 
OED’s definition of “intrastate” is “occurring within a class, 
political party, state,”43 and first quotes Emory Johnson as using 
the term in 1903 to refer to the Supreme Court’s important 1886 
Wabash decision, where the Court urged Congress to regulate the 
railroads.44 However, a search of the Wabash case did not find the 
term, though the use of “intrastate” would have been highly 
appropriate, so Johnson was likely characterizing the Court’s 
words as in some fashion embodying the concept of “intrastate.” 
The first actual usage of “intrastate” that we found by the Court 
was in 1890 in another of the by then very numerous railroad 
cases, Texas & Pacific Railway Company v. Southern Pacific 
Company.45 In a case involving whether the Louisiana Supreme 
Court improperly overturned a contract dealing with interstate 
railroad traffic, Chief Justice Fuller significantly characterized the 
plaintiff’s argument by contrasting “interstate” with “intrastate”: 
“that as the agreement related to earnings from interstate as well 
as from intrastate traffic, such decision was an interference with 
the freedom of interstate commerce . . . .”46 Clearly the two terms 
were seen here as an all-inclusive set, “interstate” expressing on 
the one hand that commerce which could be federally regulated, 
and “intrastate” on the other that which could not be, at least by 
itself, and generally that is how they have been used since. 
Thus, this use of “intrastate” excludes the considerable 
amount of activity inside a state that Marshall said could be 
included within the meaning of “among the several states,” i.e., 
 
 42. The “interstate-intrastate” distinction seems to be conceptually the same as the 
“dual federalism” concept attributed to Taney, supra pp. 109–10, DAVID M. O’BRIEN, 1 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 568–74, 694 (9th ed. 2014), though to be clear, Taney did not 
actually use these terms.  
 43. Intrastate, OXFORD, supra note 24. 
 44. Wabash, St. Louis, & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557 (1886). Apparently, 
this decision spurred Congress to pass what became known as the Interstate Commerce 
Act the next year. See infra pp. 430, 453, and note 54; see supra note 2. 
 45. Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. S. Pac. Co., 137 U.S. 48, 53 (1890). 
 46. Id. at 53 (emphasis added).  
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internal activity that “affects more states than one,” and arguably 
and crucially is not the distinction the Framers understood. To be 
sure, the Framers unquestionably recognized that much would be 
left to the states to regulate under the power to regulate 
commerce among the several states, but they did not say that “the 
much to be left to the states to regulate” would be “any and all 
commerce inside a state,” and they arguably anticipated federal 
regulation of commerce inside any number of states more than 
one by clearly choosing to use “among the several” instead of 
“between.”47 
To be sure, the Court does not always pair “intrastate” with 
“interstate commerce”, but “intrastate” has been used in most of 
the major commerce cases since its introduction, and Table 2 
shows that the two actually appear as a pair in majority opinions 
more often than the original words of the Constitution. While 
“interstate” by itself conveys the narrow “between” sense, joining 
it frequently with “intrastate” solidifies the idea that “interstate 
commerce” is limited to that which crosses a state line and 
probably only at the moment of crossing, before becoming 
“intrastate,” which is inside a state and therefore left to the states 
to regulate. Thus the two terms together reinforce the dual 
federalism approach from Taney onward, and imply that exercise 
of the “interstate commerce power” inside a state can only be 
done with the help of some kind of extending doctrines. The 
problem is that arguably neither these terms nor the concepts they 
embody reflect the original understanding or the actual meaning 
of the language of the Constitution. 
II. THE DATA 
A. EXPLANATION OF TABLE 1 
Table 1 presents our most important findings. Starting from 
the left, Column 1 shows our various time periods. Moving 
rightward are three columns all under the broader overall heading 
of “2. ‘commerce among the several states.’” First, Column 2A 
shows the total number of majority opinions for each time period 
citing “commerce among the several states.” Then Column 2B 
shows the total number of uses of that phrase within the majority 
 
 47. See supra pp. 434–37 and note 13; see infra pp. 443–45, 449, 451–52, 473–75, 477–
85, 489–491, 492–93, 497–98 and accompanying notes, and note 176. 
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opinions counted in Column 2A. Finally, Column 2C shows the 
ratio of uses of the search language per opinion-how many times 
“commerce among the several states” was used on average per 
majority opinion for that time period. 
Further to the right, the pattern repeats for the overall 
category “3. Interstate Commerce.” Under this in Column 3A, 
paralleling Column 2A, are the number of majority opinions per 
time period citing “interstate commerce” at least once. In Column 
3B are the total number of uses of that phrase in the opinions that 
used the phrase at least once, and in Column 3C is the ratio of 
uses per opinion, paralleling Columns 2B and 2C. 
At the far right, Column 4 is a ratio showing how many 
majority opinions per time period used “interstate commerce” 
divided by the number of opinions citing “commerce among the 
several states,” which is Column 3A divided by Column 2A. In 
other words, Column 4 shows how many majority opinions cited 
“interstate commerce” compared to opinions citing “commerce 
among the several states.” (There is some overlap because 
opinions often quoted both). Column 5 does the same thing for 
Columns 2B and 3B, comparing how many times “interstate 
commerce” was used in majority opinions versus “commerce 
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B. EXPLANATION AND DISCUSSION OF TABLE 1 
Table 1 shows the rapid rise and dominance of “interstate 
commerce” over “commerce among the several states” after the 
first use of the former term in 1869 by a Court majority. This rise 
can be quickly seen from the Totals row at the bottom, showing 
that overall, in the 141 years from 1869 till the end of 2009, 
majority opinions citing “interstate commerce” have exceeded 
the number of those citing “commerce among the several states” 
by over three and a half to one. The difference in the actual 
number of mentions of the terms in the majority opinions that used 
 
 48. Some data before 1890 include “inter-state.” See supra note 30. 
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either of these terms at least once was even more lopsided, over 
eight and a half to one. In other words, since its introduction in 
1869 the Court not only used “interstate commerce” in many 
more majority opinions than it used “commerce among the 
several states,” but it also used it much more often than the 
language of the Constitution within those opinions. 
In examining Table 1 more closely, we see first, that, as to 
“commerce among the several states,” in Columns 2A, B and C, 
this or some close variant was the only term used by the Court 
majority before 1869, with the limited exception, discussed below, 
of “between the several states.” After the introduction of 
“interstate commerce” in 1869, the number of opinions citing 
“commerce among the several states” gradually increased, but 
never increased greatly, always remaining below 100 cases per 
decade, and for all decades except the 1920s less than fifty 
opinions per decade. The average number of uses of “commerce 
among the states” per Court opinion was actually higher before 
the introduction of “interstate commerce,” about 4.48 uses per 
opinion up to 1869, with the bulk of these uses being in Gibbons 
and a few other cases. After that, the rate of use decreased slightly 
for a few decades, and after the 1910s began to decrease much 
more to less than two uses per case, and since the 1990’s, to little 
more than one use per case on average. 
In contrast, by 1890 “interstate commerce,” far and away 
dominated the Court’s discussion of the power over commerce. 
This is shown several ways: first, Columns 3A, B and C show that 
after 1869 “interstate commerce” rapidly rose in use, with the 
highest number of opinions citing the term in the 1910s, and then 
the number gradually tapering off thereafter. But in every decade 
since the 1890’s, the number of opinions mentioning “interstate 
commerce” exceeded those mentioning “commerce among the 
several states,” and after the 1890’s they always exceeded the 
latter by twice, and often more. In the crucial decade of the 1930s, 
majority opinions citing “interstate commerce” exceeded those 
citing the language of the Constitution by over eleven to one. 
Even in the 2000s, “interstate commerce” cases exceeded 
“commerce among the states” cases by over three to one. 
If we count the total number of uses of “interstate 
commerce” in opinions citing it compared to the total number of 
uses of “commerce among the states,” the dominance of the 
former is even more pronounced. Since the 1910s, the ratio of 
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dominance has always been at least just under ten to one, 
ironically peaking in the crucial decade of the 1930s, as shown in 
the far right column, when the number of uses of the term 
“interstate commerce” was almost forty-five times the number of 
uses citing the actual language of the Constitution. Since then the 
difference has decreased, but always remained at nearly ten-to-
one or more. These data show that, to the extent that it is invoked 
at all, the actual language of the Constitution is in a long decline 
if not actually on a path to extinction, invoked probably largely 
for symbolism, and long ago ceasing to be the working language 
of the Court. 
Some of the data from Table 1 are represented graphically in 
Chart 1 below. 
                        
Chart 1. Commerce Among the States v. Interstate Commerce: 
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Period           Term             Ratios 
  A. Commerce  B. Interstate C.  Col. B. and    4.  Column B as %  
  Among  Commerce     Intrastate            of Column A  
  The States    
1789-1869      21                1         0         5 
1870-1879      31         27           0      87 
1880-1889      47         44         0     94 
1890-1899      57       115         6   202 
1900-1909      59       143       26   242 
1910-1919      98       412     152   419 
1920-1929      45       270     119   600 
1930-1939      22       256     127            1164 
1940-1949      55       258     104   469 
1950-1959      39       155       49   397  
1960-1969      32       126       43   394 
1970-1979      30       129          41   430 
1980-1989      47       146       41   311 
1990-1999      30         84       21   280 
2000-2009      15         48       19   320 
Totals     628      2211     748   119 
 
 
C. EXPLANATION AND DISCUSSION OF TABLE 2 
 
















Table 2 lists the same time periods as in Table 1 above, and 
Column A repeats the same data as Table 1 regarding the 
occurrence of the actual language of the Constitution in majority 
opinions. Column B shows the number of opinions per decade 
quoting “interstate commerce” and “intrastate” at least once in 
the same opinion. Column C shows Column B as a percentage of 
Column A, or the frequency in which the Court used “interstate 
commerce” in the same opinion along with “intrastate,” 
compared to the frequency that it used the actual constitutional 
language. 
As Column C shows, since its first use combined with 
“interstate commerce” in a Supreme Court majority opinion in 
1890,49 “intrastate” has often been used by the Court to 
complement “interstate commerce,” and like “interstate 
commerce” its use also rose dramatically after introduction, 
 
 49. See supra p. 442 and note 46. 
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Period  “Commerce Between the States” 
1789-1869   16 
1870-1929            167 
1930-2009                        48  
Total             231 
though not to the same level. From 1910 to 1979, however, 
“intrastate” was used with “interstate commerce” in more 
opinions than the actual words of the Constitution in Column A, 
and again in the most recent decade. 
D. “BETWEEN THE STATES” 
The expressions “between the states” or “between the 
several states” were also used by the Court from the beginning, 
before and after the introduction of “interstate commerce,” but 
not nearly as often as “among the several states.” The importance 
of “between the states” is that it was and still is for some an 
expression of an early narrow meaning of the constitutional 
language, essentially having the same meaning as the later 
“interstate,” in contrast to the broader “among” meaning 
discussed above.50 Recognizing this, Table 3 shows search results 
for “commerce between the several states,” or close variations, in 
majority opinions. Because there were relatively few instances of 
the Court using “commerce between the states” we put the data 
into only three time periods. 
 






III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The data in this study resulted from an analysis of how 
frequently certain terms appeared in majority opinions of the 
United States Supreme Court when searched in LexisNexis 
 
 50. See supra note 47. 
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(hereinafter Lexis).51 In the interest of space, I will only 
summarize key methodological steps, but further information is 
available from the author. The main methodological issues were 
what search terms to use, what data sets to search, and how to 
classify the data chronologically. The actual process of deciding 
on each of the methodological steps was very pragmatic and 
interactive, with many different combinations being laboriously 
tried before deciding on a particular method. 
A. SEARCH TERMS 
1. “commerce among the several states” 
The most difficult part of defining the research methodology 
was selecting the appropriate search terms and ensuring their 
validity. The commerce clause is written in the Constitution by 
first granting Congress a power to regulate commerce, then 
directing it toward foreign nations, then to “commerce . . . among 
the several states,” and finally to the Indian tribes. In order to 
ensure that these searches were finding “among the several 
states” in the context of commerce and not something possibly 
unrelated, we had to find a way to allow for the Court possibly 
quoting the power over foreign or Indian commerce as well as the 
commerce we were looking for. After considerable 
experimentation I found that over the centuries the Court has 
employed a variety of phrasings closely related to the actual 
language of the Constitution when discussing the power over 
commerce among the several states. Sometimes the Court literally 
quoted the entire commerce power of Article I, § 8, but more 
often the court left out “with foreign nations” or “and with the 
Indian tribes.” Sometimes the Court said something like “the 
power to regulate that commerce which is among the several 
states.” Perhaps most frequently the Court paraphrased or quoted 
the constitutional language closely except for omitting the 
“several” from “among the several states.” All of these 
expressions, it seemed, were very close to the original language. 
To accommodate these various phrasings, I decided to use 
the search terms “commerce (with up to five words intervening) 
 
 51. BARBARA LEIGH SMITH ET AL, POLITICAL RESEARCH METHODS 204–25 
(1976); JOSEPH A. MAXWELL, Designing a Qualitative Study, in HANDBOOK OF APPLIED 
SOCIAL RESEARCH METHODS 69–100 (LEONARD BICKMAN AND DEBRA ROG, eds., 
1998).  
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among (up to three words intervening) states,” which 
accommodated all the above variations. I eliminated attempts to 
capture “to regulate” or variants because their presence or 
absence did not affect our purpose. Searching with five words 
intervening between “commerce” and “among” allowed for the 
inclusion of the three word phrase “with foreign nations” 
following “commerce,” or the four word phrase “with foreign 
nations and” which sometimes was used after “commerce” and 
before “among,” and did not seem to include any undesirable 
phrases. Searching with three words between “among” and 
“states” allowed for the phrase “the several” to be included, when 
the Court was quoting the actual language of the Constitution, 
and did not seem to include any inappropriate results. The actual 
Lexis search term was (“commerce w/5 among w/3 states”). 
2. “Interstate Commerce” 
“Interstate commerce,” was very easy to search for, because 
it had no variations within the phrase, so our search phrase was 
(interstate commerce). 
3. “Intrastate” 
The search for “intrastate” when combined with “interstate” 
was also straightforward. The search term was (“interstate” AND 
“intrastate”). 
4. “Commerce Between the Several States” 
The problems searching for this phrase were the same as 
those for “commerce among the several states” so we used 
essentially the same search term: (commerce w/5 between w/3 
states). 
B. THE SEARCH UNIVERSE: SUPREME COURT MAJORITY 
OPINIONS 
The goal of this study was always to focus on the Court’s 
actual words, but surprisingly it took a fair amount of 
experimentation to decide how best to do that. Unless they are 
limited, Lexis searches return such things as headnotes, syllabus, 
summaries, and often, until around the 1950’s, very lengthy 
arguments of counsel, in addition to majority, concurring, and 
dissenting opinions. In addition to greatly increasing the number 
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of search results, surprisingly headnotes, syllabi, and summaries 
often retroactively inserted “interstate commerce” or 
“intrastate,” even where the Court itself may not have used those 
terms, and sometimes did not use the actual language of the 
Constitution even where the Court did. Searching full or partial 
arguments of counsel would also have added greatly to the 
number of results and the potential complexity of analysis. I 
considered including concurring and dissenting opinions, but 
decided to exclude these also, since, while often quite important, 
they were technically not the binding opinion of the Court, and 
would add significantly to the complexity and amount of the data 
analysis, especially after it became apparent that just selecting 
majority opinions would itself produce a large amount of data. So 
I did advanced searches for all cases since 1789, but in majority 
opinions only. 
Thus, the universe and the sample for this study are the same-
all Supreme Court majority opinions since 1789, so there is no 
sampling problem. 
C. TIME PERIODS 
Experimentation also led to deciding to arrange our main 
results by decade, except for an initial period from 1789 to 1869. 
This lengthy initial period was picked both because there were 
relatively few regulation of commerce among the several states 
cases before the Civil War, as well as because the term “interstate 
commerce” was not used by the Supreme Court majority before 
1869. Shortly after this period, however, the pace of Commerce 
Clause cases picked up dramatically, and at the same time the 
Court began to heavily favor the term “interstate,” so from 1870 
on we decided to present data in Tables 1 and 2 by decades.52 This 
use of decades also gave a rough match over time to changing 
public events and changing Court doctrines, although more 
refined analysis would obviously be appropriate in a future study, 
such as of “natural courts,”53 or individual justices. However, 
using natural courts would produce several dozens of time 
periods, all of unequal length, sometimes covering only a few 
months. Analyzing by individual Chief Justices, or even by 
individual Justices would doubtless also be useful, but given that 
 
 52. Table 3 has longer time periods as explained supra p. 449. 
 53. “Natural courts” are periods in which the same justices are on the Court. 
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the purposes of this study were to simply point out that “interstate 
commerce” has largely replaced “commerce . . . among the states” 
on the Court, and to inquire into the possible significance of this 
development, it seemed sufficient to categorize by decades, which 
gives a rough measure of the relative use of the main search terms 
on a consistent and comparable chronological basis. Other 
possible bases of classification would be the amount of legislation 
passed by Congress under the power over commerce, the kind of 
commerce issue involved,54 or eras in the Court’s doctrines 
regarding the power to regulate commerce. However, analysis of 
factors such as these would greatly complicate analysis and 
comparability well beyond our purposes and resources in this 
initial study. Finally, as a practical matter, Lexis searches are 
limited to 1000 results, and by trial and error it appeared that 
breaking the analysis down by decades for majority opinions only 
would keep from having over 1000 cases in any decade, while still 
not having a large number of time periods to compare. 
D. VALIDITY OF SEARCH TERMS 
The biggest validity problems-making sure the results 
reflected what I really was looking for-arose from search results 
where the Court might have been necessarily quoting party 
names, statutory language, or perhaps its own earlier language, 
though in quoting itself there was arguably more of an element of 
the Court’s own choice. There was no way to simply eliminate this 
problem, with one huge exception. By far the biggest problem of 
invalid results arose with “interstate commerce” searches, 
stemming from the fact that the term “Interstate Commerce 
Commission” (ICC) and related terms such as “the interstate 
commerce law,” “the interstate commerce act,” “the committee 
on interstate commerce,” or “interstate commerce committee” 
began to occur with great frequency within a few years after the 
ICC was established in 1887,55 because the Commission itself was 
frequently a party before the Court for decades in hundreds of 
cases. Since none of these mentions of “interstate commerce” 
where the ICC was a party, or references to the law that created 
it could be considered voluntary expressions by the Court of its 
language preferences, I decided to exclude them by searching 
within the overall results and subtracting these terms from our 
 
 54. See supra p. 431 and note 4. 
 55. See, e.g., infra p. 457 and note 65. 
4 - WEILER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/11/19 6:28 PM 
354 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 34:429 
 
totals. This additional and laborious effort significantly reduced 
the number of cases as well as uses within cases mentioning 
“interstate commerce,” but obviously a great many still remained. 
For all search terms, our results include a number of 
instances of the Court quoting its own earlier opinions or statutes 
other than the ICC where it might be argued the Court had no 
choice in the use of one search term or the other. From much 
examination of the search results, it appears that these instances 
are relatively proportional between the two search terms, and are 
nowhere near a majority of the results. The data, combined with 
a detailed examination of numerous opinions, show beyond any 
doubt that the Court has long used “interstate commerce” as its 
term of choice for applying what the Constitution states as the 
power to “regulate commerce among the several states,” even 
though I did not separate out instances of the Court citing the 
search terms in non-ICC related statutory language or its own 
opinions. 
Searches for either “commerce among the several states” or 
the “between” variant could possibly have produced some cases 
that were actually about foreign commerce if the Court had cited 
or paraphrased the full commerce power, but inspection of the 
results showed that this was highly unlikely, largely because there 
were relatively few such cases, and also because the court usually 
limited itself to only mentioning the power over foreign 
commerce when that was the power in question. Regarding 
“commerce between the several states,” there were a few validity 
problems where a treaty of amity and commerce was involved, 
and the Court was referring to commerce between the states and 
foreign countries, or sometimes even when the Court was 
referring to actual relations between two states, and not as a 
synonym for “commerce among the several states,” so I 
individually excluded these instances. 
Regarding “intrastate,” when used by itself it could be 
completely unrelated to our concern with the commerce power, 
so I was careful to search for it only in combination with 
“interstate commerce.” Also, unlike the data in Table 1, I did not 
eliminate instances in Table 2 where the sole mention of 
“interstate” resulted from a reference to the ICC. Thus, the 
number of opinions cited in Table 2 includes a few cases that 
would not have been included in Table 1 because their only 
reference to “interstate commerce” appearing jointly with 
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“intrastate” was where the former referred to the ICC. However, 
the additional number of such cases appears to be relatively small, 
and in any case, “intrastate” did not appear in the legislation 
creating the ICC, so its use was still voluntary by the Court even 
in such cases, and obviously the term was utilized and understood 
as complementary to and exclusive of “interstate commerce” 
whether or not the latter term was required by legislation. Finally, 
despite care in searching, there is a very small chance that even 
when used in the same opinion with “interstate commerce,” 
occurrences of “intrastate” might not refer to activities relevant 
to our purposes. 
IV.  ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
A. “INTERSTATE COMMERCE” BECOMES THE WHOLE 
MEANING OF “COMMERCE AMONG THE SEVERAL STATES.” 
After the Civil War the commerce-narrowing doctrines 
established by Taney were obviously no longer needed to protect 
slavery. However, for the most part they did not disappear but 
were refashioned during the so-called “laissez-faire” or Lochner 
era, where a goal of the Court was to keep most federal and state 
regulation of the now rapidly growing national and international 
economy within fairly strict limits, and particularly to keep 
regulation of “production”—especially regulations of labor and 
manufacturing-out of federal and sometimes even state control. 
A key part of the effort to keep the federal power over 
commerce among the states narrow seems to have been changing 
the name of the power. Once adopted by the Court, and especially 
when contrasted with “intrastate,” the term “interstate 
commerce” seemed to exactly express the Court’s thinking and 
rapidly became the primary language for the Court to express and 
limit the power to regulate commerce among the states as the 
cases involving that power multiplied in response to the growing 
economy. Above it was shown how at first the Court seemed to 
actually apply “interstate commerce” to what was truly only 
“between” states. Quite rapidly, however, a synechdoche was 
created, and the part became the whole: “interstate commerce” 
became not just a gloss but the power to regulate commerce 
among the several states itself. For example, Justice Swayne 
writing in 1876 said “[t]he commerce clauses of the Constitution 
had their origin in a wise and salutary policy. They give to 
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Congress the entire control of the foreign and inter-state 
commerce of the country.”56 
Clearly, “interstate commerce” had become “the commerce 
clause” for Justice Swayne as early as 1876. Similarly, in the 
otherwise thoroughly obscure 1898 case of Vance v. Vandercook 
Justice White noted-without examining its significance-the 
already achieved dominance of the term “interstate commerce”: 
“the statute was repugnant to the third clause of section 8 of the 
first article of the [C]onstitution of the United States, commonly 
spoken of as the ‘[I]nterstate [C]ommerce clause’ of the 
[C]onstitution.”57 An equivalence between “between” and 
“interstate” and a reading of “between” and “interstate” into the 
Framers’ purposes in drafting the Constitution was also expressed 
in 1893 by Justice Brewer: 
Commerce between the States is a matter of national 
regulation, and to establish it as such was one of the principal 
causes which led to the adoption of our [C]onstitution. To-day, 
the volume of interstate commerce far exceeds the anticipation 
of those who framed this [C]onstitution, and the main channels 
through which this interstate commerce passes are the 
railroads of the country.58 
Thus, in addition to its quantitative dominance shown above, 
more importantly, the term “interstate commerce” seems 
certainly by the end of the 19th century to have become accepted 
qualitatively as equivalent to the “between” meaning of “among 
the several states,” in contrast to the “inside” meaning, and to 
express the Court’s conception of the power granted by the 
Framers as not normally reaching inside states. Unlike most 
doctrine, if such it was, however, the transition in terminology and 
whatever it was intended to mean was not announced nor even 
examined but instead simply occurred, apparently without anyone 
objecting or even noticing. 
A further elaboration on the “interstate-intrastate” 
dichotomy came in 1895 in the important case United States v. E. 
C. Knight Co.,59 which dealt with whether the newly passed 
Sherman Antitrust Act60 would apply to a monopoly of the 
 
 56. Inman Steamship Co. v. Tinker, 94 U.S. 238, 245 (1876) (emphasis added). 
 57. Vance v. W.A. Vandercook Company, 170 US 438, 442 (1898) (emphasis added). 
 58. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368, 378 (1893) (emphasis added). 
 59. 156 U.S. 1 (1895). 
 60. Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as 15 U.S.C. § 1). 
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production of refined sugar. Even though the Act itself utilized 
only the language “commerce among the several states” in 
defining the basis for banning formation of monopolies, and never 
used “interstate commerce,” Chief Justice Fuller repeatedly 
translated the former into the latter.61 Though the Court did not 
actually pair “interstate commerce” with “intrastate,” it ruled that 
the power over “interstate commerce” could not reach 
production, because production was by definition “local,” and not 
commerce, and thereby left entirely to the states to regulate in 
order to preserve our “dual form of government.”62 Furthermore, 
the Court ruled that even if production, in this case refining of 
sugar, was clearly done for the purpose of out-of-state sale, and 
clearly affected “interstate commerce,” nonetheless production 
only “indirectly” affected interstate commerce, not “directly,” 
and thus could not be federally regulated, presumably even with 
the “affecting commerce” doctrine. To be sure, here the Court 
was primarily focusing on defining the term “commerce” so as to 
exclude “production,” but there is a strong overlap between 
“intrastate” activity being outside federal control and production 
being considered as “local” or “intrastate” by definition.63 
The narrow meaning of the regulation of commerce as 
limited to regulation of movement across state lines was also the 
meaning conveyed in the landmark act of 1887 creating the 
Interstate Commerce Commission. The actual title of the act was 
“An Act to Regulate Commerce,” and the only reference in the 
Act to “inter-state” was in the section creating the Interstate 
Commerce Commission, but the Act immediately became 
universally known as the “Interstate Commerce Act,” its title a 
tribute to the rising popularity of “interstate commerce.”64 As 
noted by an early railroad law expert, this Act was perceived to 
 
 61. The relevant language of § 1 of the Act was: “Every contract, combination in the 
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the 
several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal.” § 2 of the act 
repeated the “among the several states” language. The act was entitled “An act to protect 
trade and commerce” . . .” However, the statute somewhat ambiguously referred to goods 
moving from one state to another, as if that were the meaning of the constitutional 
language. Id. The Court’s opinion used “among the several states” five times, and 
“interstate commerce,” “trade,” or “market” 13 times. Knight, 156 U.S. at 9–17.  
 62. Knight, 156 U.S. at 15.  
 63. Infra pp. 458, 463, 473, 484–85, and notes 176 and 178.  
 64. The term “interstate commerce” appeared in the act itself exactly once, in § 11, 
creating the “Inter-State Commerce Commission.” Interstate Commerce Act, ch. 104, 
PUB. L. 49-41 (1887), abolished 109 Stat. 803, PUB. L. 104-88 (1995). 
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express the “interstate-intrastate” distinction, clearly 
distinguishing between permissible federal control over railroad 
traffic crossing state lines and intrastate traffic beyond federal 
control.65 But while the “interstate-intrastate” distinction may 
have been conceptually appealing, as a practical matter the 
difficulty of separating “interstate” from “intrastate” railway 
traffic in many situations led to a series of arcane and tortured 
decisions over the next several decades in which the Court 
repeatedly tried to decide under what circumstances many highly 
specific aspects of integrated railroad operations, such as 
passengers, freight, railway cars and engines, railway workers, and 
particular operations of the railroads were to be legally classed 
either as “interstate” or as “intrastate,” while still allowing some 
degree of effective overall regulation.66 Eventually the 
impracticality of the linguistic straitjacket of the interstate-
intrastate distinction that both the Court and Congress had 
created for themselves regarding railroad regulation and other 
matters led, as discussed next, to the Court finding a variety of 
ways to extend the reach of “the interstate commerce power” 
inside states. Arguably they could have done the same thing 
simply by construing “among the several states” to reach inside 
more than one state by definition. 
B. INTERSTATE COMMERCE REACHES INTRASTATE 
One of the first decisions to breach the linguistic confines of 
the “interstate-intrastate commerce” dichotomy came in 1911 
when the Court upheld seizing impure eggs inside a state under 
the Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906 as an exercise of the 
“interstate commerce power” and the necessary and proper 
clause. As Justice McKenna stated, “[t]he question in the case, 
therefore is, What power has Congress over such articles? Can 
they escape the consequences of their illegal transportation by 
 
 65. EMORY R. JOHNSON, AMERICAN RAILWAY TRANSPORTATION, 361 (1903). 
 66. Congress also eventually modified the law to fit reality. James W. Ely, Jr., “The 
railroad system has burst through State limits”: Railroads and Interstate Commerce,1830-
1920, 55 ARK. L. REV. 933, 968–69 (2003). Ironically, the title of this article itself expressed 
the problem of the need to “burst through” and reach inside states despite characterizing 
federal power as limited to “interstate commerce.” The author recognized this problem 
when he concluded that “the railroad experience . . . suggests that there is an air of 
unreality about drawing precise lines between interstate and intrastate commerce.” Id. at 
979. We agree entirely but argue that the “unreality” stems from the ersatz language on 
which the Court relied instead of the actual constitutional language.  
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being mingled at the place of destination with other property?”67 
The defendant had argued that after crossing the state line “the 
eggs had passed into the general mass of property in the State and 
out of the field covered by interstate commerce” and were hence 
beyond the reach of “the interstate commerce power.”68 Thus, the 
argument seemed clearly cast in terms of whether the eggs were 
in the process of crossing a state boundary (i.e., “interstate”), and 
were thus within “the rule which marks the line between the 
exercise of Federal power and state power over articles of 
legitimate commerce,” (i.e., intrastate,) or could somehow still be 
reached even though clearly inside a state. In upholding the 
federal law, the Court remained entirely within the “interstate” 
framework, but accepted the need to regulate the adulterated 
eggs that had passed out of “interstate commerce” and gone 
inside the state by using the necessary and proper clause in order 
to uphold the “goal” of the statute. 69 But in referring to eggs that 
had “mingled with” other property, Justice McKenna seemed 
unaware of the fact discussed above70 that the actual power in the 
Constitution, “among the several states” arguably already meant 
“mingled with,” and thus whether they had previously crossed a 
state line or not, in-state eggs mingled with “interstate eggs” could 
arguably be regulated by definition as a “legitimate goal” in 
themselves under the power to regulate commerce among the 
several states without need of assistance from the necessary and 
proper clause at all. 
Another important early workaround on the limits of the 
interstate-intrastate commerce dichotomy came in the 1905 case 
Swift & Company v. United States.71 Swift concerned the 
application of the 1890 Sherman Antitrust Act to Swift and other 
Midwest meatpackers controlling about 60% of the national 
market and accused of conspiring to fix prices, manipulate the 
market for cattle, arrange artificially low railroad rates, and other 
monopolistic actions. Counsel for Swift and the others argued that 
what they were doing was not “interstate trade or commerce” 
because the sales of fresh meat “were made at the places where 
the meats [were] prepared” by the buyers’ agents at the 
 
 67. Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 45, 58 (1911) (emphasis added). 
 68. Id. at 55 (emphasis added). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Supra pp. 435–36. 
 71. 196 U.S. 375 (1905). 
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slaughterhouses and were therefore “domestic sales,” that the 
delivery of the meat to the railroads was itself not any part of 
“interstate transportation,” and that the sales to agents of buyers 
from other states were also “not incidents of interstate 
commerce,” presumably because the actual act of sale occurred 
inside a state. Thus, Swift’s counsel were implicitly invoking the 
“interstate-intrastate” dichotomy and arguing for a very narrow, 
border-crossing definition of “commerce among the several 
states” with no look to the broader context and movement of the 
activities and goods in question. Swift also argued that any effect, 
if any, of their meat-packing on interstate commerce, was only 
indirect, invoking the Knight doctrine that production only 
indirectly affected commerce,72 and that any ultimate purpose or 
fact of the sales of the cattle or meat to go into broader commerce 
in other states did not matter despite their 60% control. The 
government countered that there was a broader effect on 
commerce deriving from the companies’ overall pattern of 
activity, and though the government’s attorneys argued 
exclusively within the language of “interstate commerce,” they 
tied it to a broad Marshallian meaning taken literally from 
Gibbons, defining it repeatedly and literally to mean “that 
commerce which affects more states than one.”73 
Holmes’ unanimous opinion in Swift upheld federal 
regulation of sales of cattle in stockyards even though the activity 
might not be in the “original package,” i.e., the cow had been cut 
up into packages of meat, and even though the individual sales in 
question might not be made while directly crossing a state 
boundary, because all the transactions formed “a current of 
commerce” Holmes generally agreed with the government and 
while he did not refer directly to Gibbons, he did follow the broad 
interpretation of Gibbons, and his “current of commerce” image 
corresponded closely to Marshall’s (and Dr. Johnson’s) primary 
 
 72. Supra pp. 456–57. 
 73. For Swift’s argument, see Swift & Co. v. United States, 1905 LEXIS U.S. 908, 2–
17. The government anachronistically argued, for example “[a]s to what is interstate 
commerce, see Gibbons v. Ogden” . . . .” But it broadly interpreted “interstate commerce” 
by drawing on Gibbons: “[i]f interstate commerce is commerce which concerns more States 
than one, and if a combination of independent producers to suppress competition between 
its members is a restraint upon commerce, it must follow that a combination of 
independent producers to fix and control prices and suppress competition between each 
other in an area covering more States than one is in restraint of interstate commerce” . . . .” 
Id. at 19–20 (emphasis added). As noted above, the act itself did not contain the language 
“interstate commerce.” See supra p. 457 and note 61. 
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definition of commerce as “intercourse,”74 as well as to Marshall’s 
definition of commerce among the states as that commerce which 
“concerns more states than one.” Though perfunctorily citing 
Knight, Holmes completely bypassed Knight’s direct-indirect 
distinction, saying commerce is a “practical” matter, and any 
artificial or formalistic approach in this area (presumably as in 
Knight) was especially likely to be inadequate. Holmes also 
referred to Swift’s “current of commerce” as having a “unity,” 
evoking Marshall’s comment in Gibbons, that “commerce is a 
unit.”75 
Holmes’ opinion interestingly never used the term 
“interstate commerce,” and instead employed the original 
constitutional language.76 However, despite the fact that the 
Sherman Act also did not use “interstate commerce,” everyone 
else involved in the case heavily utilized “interstate commerce,” 
including both counsel, as already mentioned, and also the 
headnote and syllabus writers, who helpfully and 
anachronistically modernized Holmes’ careful use of the actual 
constitutional language into “interstate commerce.” This contrast 
between Holmes’ adherence to the actual language of the 
Constitution77 and everyone else’s use of neologisms not only is a 
tribute to the latter’s dominance, but also strengthens the idea 
that the Court and other actors in the constitutional interpretation 
process were not forced to employ “interstate commerce” by the 
language of legislation, or anything else, but instead chose on their 
own to use the recently invented term. 
A third early and important tear in the Court’s self-created 
linguistic straitjacket of the interstate-intrastate distinction came 
 
 74. Supra note 13. 
 75. Swift, 196 U.S. at 194. Holmes also did not seem to rely on the necessary and 
proper clause. 
 76. See supra pp. 455–56 and note 61.  
 77. Holmes’ dissent in the earlier N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904), 
which also tested the Sherman Act, similarly used only the actual language of the 
Constitution, or the “between” variant, while everyone else heavily used “interstate 
commerce.” However, most commentators assume Holmes in both cases and the Sherman 
Act said or should be understood to have meant “interstate commerce:” for example, 
regarding Holmes’ opinion in Swift, Richard A. Epstein wrote: “Justice Holmes came out 
of his dissent in Northern Securities and wrote for a unanimous Court condemning this 
cartel for its effect on interstate commerce”[.]” Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of 
the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REV. 1387, 1439 (1987) (emphasis added). So if Holmes 
avoided using the term “interstate commerce,” did he nonetheless mean it? Or was his 
careful use of language sending some other message? See also supra pp. 455–56 and infra 
note 149.  
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in The Shreveport Rate Cases in 1914. Similarly to what it had done 
in Hipolite Egg and Swift, here the Court announced another 
doctrine whereby federal control could reach inside states to 
regulate railroads. In his majority opinion Justice Hughes applied 
the “interstate-intrastate” distinction, writing that congressional 
authority over interstate carriers “necessarily embraces the right 
to control their operations in all such matters having such a close 
and substantial relation to interstate traffic that the control is 
essential or appropriate,” and 
[t]he fact that carriers are instruments of intrastate commerce, 
as well as of interstate commerce, does not derogate from the 
complete and paramount authority of Congress over the latter, 
or preclude the Federal power from being exerted to prevent 
the intrastate operations of such carriers from being made a 
means of injury to that which has been confided to Federal 
care.78 
So, while intrastate railroad operations were off-limits to 
federal regulation in principle, they could be regulated if they had 
“a close and substantial relation to” interstate operations. 
Ironically, in the process of making another exception to the 
Court’s self-created interstate-intrastate dichotomy in Shreveport, 
the Court again used a form of “mingle”: “[a]s Congress could 
limit the hours of labor of those engaged in interstate 
transportation, it necessarily followed that its will could not be 
frustrated by . . . the commingling of duties relating to interstate 
and intrastate operations.”79 In other words, the fact that railroad 
activity might be “intrastate” would not bar federal regulation (as 
it had arguably in Knight and other cases) if that activity was 
commingled with “interstate” activity. But “mingled with” was 
Dr. Johnson’s definition of “among,” and essentially Marshall’s 
definition of “among” in Gibbons,80 so, like the Hipolite Egg 
Court, the Shreveport Court could arguably just as easily have 
used the original constitutional language without having to invent 
the “close and substantial relation” test at all to overcome the 
artificially narrow limits of the Court’s own interstate-intrastate 
dichotomy. 
 
 78. Hous., E. & W. Tex. Ry. Co. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342, 351 (1914) (emphasis 
added). 
 79. Id. at 352 (emphasis added). 
 80. See supra pp. 435–46. 
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But while the ICC may have broken through the interstate-
intrastate barrier regarding most aspects of regulation of the 
railroads following Shreveport, it long allowed racial segregation 
of “interstate” passengers in transportation until finally banning 
it in 1955. However, in many Southern states, the main and easily 
foreseeable effect of this ban on “interstate” transportation was 
to activate the trusty interstate-intrastate distinction, so that 
suddenly signs appeared literally designating separate waiting 
rooms for white or colored “intrastate passengers,” often 
adjoining theoretically integrated “interstate passenger” waiting 
rooms, causing great confusion and largely undermining the ICC 
decision. This application of the interstate-intrastate distinction 
not only resonated directly with Taney’s earlier dual federalism 
pro-slavery decisions, but exemplified again the real bite as well 
as the unworkability of that distinction, demonstrating why, to be 
effective, federal power over commerce must often reach inside 
states according to its “among” meaning without reliance on 
commerce extending doctrines. Racial integration of intrastate 
bus waiting rooms as well as of many informally segregated 
interstate ones only came about officially in 1961 with another 
ICC decision, in large part as a result of pressure from the 
Freedom Rides.81 
C. THE NEW DEAL ERA 
Hipolite Egg, Swift and Shreveport showed that extending the 
reach of the “interstate commerce power” inside states to uphold 
national legislation in the Progressive Era could be done by 
applying various extending doctrines, but these doctrines were 
narrow in application. A generation later, in 1937, after initial 
resistance by the Court to New Deal programs, the Court 
eventually extended these corollary doctrines quite broadly. But 
in so doing, despite what is often called a “constitutional 
revolution,” the Court still remained within the language of 
“interstate commerce” and still relied on the necessary and 
proper clause. 
In the landmark 1937 Jones & Laughlin v. NLRB case, the 
Court ended years of conflict with the New Deal, greatly widening 
 
 81. CATHERINE A. BARNES, JOURNEY FROM JIM CROW: THE DESEGREGATION OF 
SOUTHERN TRANSIT, 99–107, 157–79 (1983). 
4 - WEILER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/11/19 6:28 PM 
364 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 34:429 
 
the breach in the barrier between inter- and intrastate activities it 
had already made in the earlier cases above. The Court held that 
[a]lthough activities may be intrastate in character when 
separately considered, if they have such a close and substantial 
relation to interstate commerce that their control is essential or 
appropriate to protect that commerce from burdens and 
obstructions, Congress cannot be denied the power to exercise 
that control.82 
Significantly, at the outset of his Jones & Laughlin opinion, 
Chief Justice Hughes described in great detail the flow of activity 
from mining iron ore to shipping it across the Great Lakes to 
refining it into steel and fabricating it into finished goods and 
further transporting it for sale in retail stores in other states. This 
description not only evoked Holmes’ “current of commerce” 
metaphor from Swift, but also exemplified “intercourse,” Dr. 
Johnson’s and Marshall’s definition of “commerce,” as well as 
Marshall’s characterization of commerce as a “unit”—a continual 
set of interactions comprising an identifiable whole that has 
commercial sense and coherence, indifferent to state boundaries, 
if affecting more states than one.83 The fact of a large and 
vertically integrated enterprise crossing state and national 
borders also evoked the “mingled with” or “concerns more states 
than one” meaning of “among the several states.”84 Yet despite all 
these implicit references to the arguably broad original meaning 
of the power to regulate commerce among the several states as 
expressed in Gibbons, the Court performed even this historic turn 
while remaining within the linguistic constraints of “interstate” 
and “intrastate commerce,” extending the reach of the former 
into the latter through the necessary and proper clause.85 
To be sure, if Congress really only had power over “interstate 
commerce,” it was (and is) probably correct that most intrastate 
activities can only be regulated by the necessary and proper clause 
extending inside states from state borders. But, again, the 
question we pose is not how far can the “interstate commerce 
power” reach inside states assisted by the necessary and proper 
 
 82. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937) (emphasis added). 
 83. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 194 (1824). 
 84. Id. at 194. 
 85. Hughes suggested that the “close and substantial effects” test relied on this clause 
of Art. I, § 8, cl. 18 by using “necessary,” as well as “appropriate” from McCulloch v. 
Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 420–21 (1819). Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 37. 
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clause, but how far the can the power “To regulate Commerce . . . 
among the several States” reach inside states of its own force 
unassisted by the necessary and proper clause. So, from our point 
of view, all the Jones & Laughlin Court did was to take the power 
over commerce back to its original meaning through an artificial, 
circuitous, and unnecessarily complex linguistic and constitutional 
path. 
In any event, the real breakthrough of Jones & Laughlin was 
in concluding broadly that separate, individual and “local” 
instances of intrastate productive activities could be regulated if 
they created a burden or substantial effect on interstate 
commerce. Not only did this formulation effectively overturn the 
direct-indirect distinction of Knight and its ban on regulating 
production generally, but it also laid the groundwork for the 
Wickard “aggregation” test of 1942, discussed more fully below. 
After Jones & Laughlin the Court continued to expand the 
reach of the “interstate commerce” power by using doctrines 
which still ultimately relied on the necessary and proper clause, 
but were also often linguistically confused. The next year, in 
upholding the Wagner Act against a strike-breaking company, 
Chief Justice Hughes explained how that which could or could not 
be regulated under the power to regulate “interstate commerce” 
could not be precisely calculated like a “mathematical formula,” 
implicitly referring to Knight’s direct-indirect test. Hughes 
confusingly said, 
where federal control is sought to be exercised over activities 
which separately considered are intrastate, it must appear that 
there is a close and substantial relation to interstate commerce 
in order to justify the federal intervention for its protection.  
. . . 
But such [mathematical] formulas are not provided by the great 
concepts of the Constitution such as “interstate commerce,” 
“due process,” “equal protection.”86 
Clearly Hughes felt that a term—“interstate commerce”—
neither in the Constitution nor invented till decades after its 
ratification, was not only a “great concept” of the Constitution, 
embodying the meaning of “commerce among the several states,” 
 
 86. Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Co. v. NLRB, 303 U.S. 453, 466–68 (1938) (emphasis 
added). 
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but was also on the same level as the actual language of the 
Constitution’s Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. True, by 
saying the “great concepts” of the Constitution such as “interstate 
commerce” do not provide “mathematical formulas” like the 
“direct-indirect” dichotomy, he was apparently agreeing with 
Marshall that the power over commerce among the several states 
should not be defined by a “mathematical line.”87 But he totally 
overlooked the fact that the “interstate-intrastate” dichotomy is 
fully as or more mathematically precise as, if not also substantially 
identical to, the “direct-indirect” dichotomy he had just rejected,88 
and that its mathematical precision similarly caused, as in earlier 
cases, a regulatory impracticality which could only be escaped 
through the help of the necessary and proper clause. While he 
avoided the “flow” analogy in this case, Hughes overlooked the 
inherent conflict between the “great concept” of “interstate 
commerce” limited to crossing state boundaries and the actual 
intercourse inside states he had described the year before in Jones 
and Laughlin.89 
A few years later, in United States v Darby,90 a very important 
1941 New Deal case upholding the wages and hours provisions of 
the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Chief Justice Stone tried to 
reconcile the actual language of the Constitution with “interstate 
commerce” and its extensions, but instead only tied himself in 
linguistic knots: 
[t]he power of Congress over interstate commerce is not 
confined to the regulation of commerce among the states. It 
extends to those activities intrastate which so affect interstate 
commerce or the exercise of the power of Congress over it as 
to make regulation of them appropriate means to the 
attainment of a legitimate end, the exercise of the granted 
power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce. See 
McCulloch v. Maryland . . . .91 
Stone’s first sentence is certainly ambiguous (as well as 
anachronistic.) It literally seems to state that the power over 
 
 87. Supra p. 435. 
 88. Supra pp. 454, 458, and infra p. 489.  
 89. See discussion supra p. 465. Santa Cruz, 303 U.S. at 464–68. 
 90. 312 U.S. 100 (1941). Interestingly, Darby applied the “interstate doctrine” to 
overrule and broaden Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918), the opinion and holding 
in which arguably limited the regulation of the already limited concept of interstate 
commerce to even less than interstate commerce. 
 91. Darby, 312 U.S. at 118–19 (emphasis added). 
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interstate commerce goes beyond the power granted in the actual 
English words of the Constitution. However, since that reading is 
implausible, on more careful reading Stone probably meant that 
the two terms were identical, and the “is not confined” language 
was setting the stage for his second sentence. This says that the 
power over “interstate commerce” extends to intrastate activities 
which sufficiently affect interstate commerce or Congress’s power 
over it, via the necessary and proper clause, which he invokes by 
citing and paraphrasing McCulloch, the case which of course 
famously explicated the necessary and proper clause. Thus, 
depending on the meaning of his first sentence, it would seem that 
Stone assumed that the power to regulate “commerce among the 
states” could either at most (and perhaps not even) cover only 
activities crossing state lines, or it could parallel the power over 
interstate commerce, which could not reach inside states by itself, 
but could be extended to intrastate activities by means of the 
affecting commerce test based on the necessary and proper clause. 
Thus it seems clear that Stone believed that reaching inside states 
via the interstate commerce power would require the necessary 
and proper clause and reaching inside a state via the power to 
regulate commerce among the several states either would require 
the same assistance or would not be possible at all. In either case, 
he had pulled back from Marshall’s statement that the power over 
commerce among the states reaches of its own power that 
commerce which affects more states than one, and instead 
asserted that it could only do so with the help of the necessary and 
proper clause. 
Stone also stated that the “interstate commerce power” is the 
actual power in the Constitution when he said that the power of 
Congress is “the granted power. . . to regulate interstate 
commerce.”92 To be sure, Stone presumably knew that the actual 
words in the Constitution were not literally “interstate 
commerce.” However, so entrenched had “interstate commerce” 
become in Court and general discourse that apparently “interstate 
commerce” was how Stone and presumably the rest of the Court 
and much of the public had long conceived, expressed, 
comprehended, and applied the actual words of the power to 
regulate commerce among the several states. 
 
 92. Id. at 118 (emphasis added). 
4 - WEILER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/11/19 6:28 PM 
368 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 34:429 
 
But how a power can be granted in the Constitution even 
though it is not stated there (and can possibly be broader than the 
power that is granted there) is certainly quite a puzzle. Anyone 
subscribing to the narrow “interstate commerce” view of the 
meaning of the power over commerce who carefully read Stone’s 
statement, especially someone already opposed to the New Deal’s 
expansion of federal power in the first place, could well have 
looked at Stone’s statement where the Court seemed to actually 
state that it was going beyond the reach of the literal power stated 
in the Constitution, as an expression of an imperial Court 
stretching the Constitution beyond its proper bounds to extend 
big government. Even if his statement was only an explanation of 
why the necessary and proper clause had to be applied to reach 
intrastate activities, many could still object. And if the power 
“granted” in the Constitution really is the “interstate commerce” 
power, perhaps they have a point! 
In our view, however, the problem is not stretching the 
“interstate commerce power” too far, as commonly argued, but 
the Court’s narrowly conceiving of the power in the Constitution 
as the “interstate commerce power” in the first place, and then 
gradually extending the latter by the affecting commerce test or 
similar extending doctrines. The force of the long-established 
“interstate commerce” terminology and the appeal of the 
interstate-intrastate dichotomy had become so great by the 1930s 
that even while defending a newly broad application of “the 
interstate commerce power” as necessary and proper to sustain 
the New Deal, Stone reinforced the legitimation of artificially new 
language and narrow doctrine, albeit arguably only reinventing in 
a much more complicated way largely what Marshall had already 
explicated over a century before. 
Finally, in Darby Stone invoked a form of the term 
“mingled” in explicating “interstate commerce.” Shortly after his 
discussion of the necessary and proper clause quoted above, Stone 
said “[a] familiar like exercise of power is the regulation of 
intrastate transactions which are so commingled with or related to 
interstate commerce that all must be regulated if the interstate 
commerce is to be effectively controlled.” By using “comingled” 
Stone might just as well have called it an exercise of the power to 
regulate commerce among the several states, but like 
predecessors and successors on the Court, Stone was apparently 
unaware that “commingled with” arguably was the actual meaning 
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of “among,” as stated in Gibbons and Dr. Johnson’s Dictionary.93 
So enmeshed was Stone in the linguistic tangle of the interstate-
intrastate distinction that to extricate himself he unwittingly 
deployed the original meaning of the Constitution as though it 
were a new gloss necessary to adapt the Constitution to modern 
circumstances. Stone’s elaborate explication of extra-
Constitutional language is further testimony to how “interstate 
commerce” had replaced, unworkably narrowed, and generally 
confused the meaning of what the Framers had arguably 
understood “commerce among the several states” to mean in the 
first place. 
A few years later, in 1942, the Court decided Wickard v. 
Filburn,94 generally regarded as extending the “interstate 
commerce power” as far as it has ever gone in allowing the 
regulation of activity inside states.95 Here, contrasting with the 
enormous, international, vertically integrated industrial 
conglomerate of Jones & Laughlin, the issue was whether a single 
farmer, Filburn, could be fined for violating the second 
Agricultural Adjustment Act by growing wheat for ‘personal’ 
consumption,96 beyond the amount of wheat allocated him under 
the Act. Here the Court accepted the idea of regulating even very 
minor productive activities inside a state if the individual activities 
collectively as a class affected commerce, sometimes called the 
“aggregation” test: 
That appellee’s own contribution to the demand for wheat may 
be trivial by itself is not enough to remove him from the scope 
of federal regulation where, as here, his contribution, taken 
together with that of many others similarly situated, is far from 
trivial.97 
This rationale laid the basis for cases in the 1960s and 
afterwards upholding civil rights, environmental and other 
regulations, many of which reach individual intrastate activities 
 
 93. See supra pp. 435–36. 
 94. 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
 95. However, we agree with Balkin that Wickard was actually not that much of an 
extension of the power over commerce. BALKIN supra note 4, at 164–65. 
 96. How “personal” Filburn’s consumption of the additional wheat actually was is 
debatable, since most of it went to feed his dairy cattle or poultry, whose products in turn 
went to market, and for next year’s seed. Thus in reality, nearly all of Filburn’s wheat went 
directly to market or substituted for it, and despite all the controversy, the case seems 
clearly about commercial activity. Wickard, 317 U. S. at 114–15.  
 97. Id. at 127–28.  
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that might be trivial and even non-economic in themselves, but 
which collectively exert a substantial effect on “interstate 
commerce.”98 
And in again dismissing the “direct” versus “indirect” effects 
test applied earlier to production in Knight and some other cases, 
and sustaining federal regulation of “local” activity, Justice 
Jackson’s opinion in Wickard applied the “affecting commerce” 
doctrine. But even the broad application of doctrine by such a 
master of words as Justice Jackson remained bound largely within 
the discourse of “interstate commerce” and “intrastate” or “local” 
activity: 
even if appellee’s activity be local and though it may not be 
regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be 
reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect 
on interstate commerce, and this irrespective of whether such 
effect is what might at some earlier time have been defined as 
“direct” or “indirect.”99 
But arguably the Court’s extension of the “interstate 
commerce power” through the affecting commerce test or similar 
extending doctrines in Wickard and the other cases above 
amounted largely to what we argue Chief Justice Marshall said 
was the power to regulate commerce among the several states in 
Gibbons in 1824, i.e., the power to regulate that commerce “that 
concerns more states than one”—a power that regulates 
“intercourse” “intermingled with” the states. The crucial 
difference is that in Gibbons Marshall explicated the actual 
language of the Constitution, so that for him going inside a state 
was part of “commerce among the several states,” while in these 
more recent New Deal era “interstate commerce” cases, adding 
the “affecting commerce” test was necessary to reach “intrastate 
commerce” or other activities which the original language of the 
Constitution might have reached unaided. How originalists on the 
modern Court and twentieth century scholars, especially 
originalists and conservatives, have treated these extensions of 
the “interstate commerce” power is a point to which we now 
turn.100 
 
 98. See discussion supra p. 430. 
 99. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 125 (emphasis added). 
 100. This is not to say that the original understanding or Marshall in Gibbons did not 
also include an “affecting commerce” test as part of the power to regulate commerce, only 
to say that its application did not necessarily begin at the same restricted point somewhere 
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D. MODERN ORIGINALISTS AND THE “INTERSTATE 
COMMERCE” POWER 
Many modern conservatives have attacked the Court’s broad 
interpretation of the “interstate commerce power” since Jones & 
Laughlin, or in some cases, even its narrower decisions during the 
Progressive era, often on originalist grounds.101 To be sure, as 
already mentioned,102 there are several dimensions to critiques of 
the power over commerce among the several states, and because 
of space limitations we deal here only with aspects of whether the 
power extends inside states. 
1. Conservative Originalists on the Modern Court 
Many years after the New Deal Court first allowed broad use 
of the commerce power beginning in 1937, a more conservative 
Court in 1995 ended the long period of broad and essentially 
unquestioned congressional use of that power. Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, writing the majority opinion in United States v. 
Lopez,103 overturned the Gun Free School Zone Act as exceeding 
the power over commerce among the several states, the first time 
the Court had overturned a law passed only under that power 
since 1936.104 
After first reviewing the facts and providing an overview of 
the development of commerce law, Rehnquist invoked 
originalism with a call for a return to “first principles.”105 After 
this portentous call, however, he repeatedly referred to the power 
over activities inside states as stemming from the ability to 
“affect” “interstate commerce”: “[w]here economic activity 
substantially affects interstate commerce, legislation regulating 
that activity will be sustained.” In fact, Rehnquist wrote the 
neologism “interstate commerce” a total of 56 times, while 
 
along the mathematical line of a state boundary where it begins under “interstate 
commerce.” See also infra at pp. 491–92 and 494–95. 
 101. See the Federalist Society reading lists on Federalism and the Commerce Power. 
Roger Clegg et al., “Conservative and Libertarian Legal Scholarship: An Annotated 
Bibliography”, THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY (2011), https://fedsoc-cms-
public.s3.amazonaws.com/update/pdf/urFFkbJ6p75qQKfGEoNvG84wzfbwqsaijgGRPtB
J.pdf. See also, David F. Forte, Commerce Among the Several States, in THE HERITAGE 
GUIDE TO THE CONSTITUTION, 101 (David F. Forte, ed., 2005). 
 102. See supra p. 451. 
 103. 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995). 
 104. With the brief exception of Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), 
overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
 105. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552.  
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quoting the actual language of the Constitution, “commerce . . . 
among the several states,” exactly two times, and once without 
“several.” 
Apparently, the conservative Chief Justice did not notice he 
was applying “first principles” using language not invented until 
well after the Constitution was written, nor did many 
conservatives and originalists who praised the decision. But more 
important is how “interstate commerce” thinking affected 
Rehnquist’s reasoning: one of the key parts of the opinion is 
where Rehnquist first considered how much something had to 
affect commerce in order to be within the “interstate commerce” 
power: 
. . . Congress’ commerce authority includes the power to 
regulate those 
activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce, 
. . . i.e., those activities that substantially affect interstate 
commerce . . . . Within this final category, admittedly, our case 
law has not been clear whether an activity must “affect” or 
“substantially affect” interstate commerce in order to be within 
Congress’ power to regulate it under the Commerce Clause. . . 
. We conclude, consistent with the great weight of our case law, 
that the proper test requires an analysis of whether the 
regulated activity “substantially affects” interstate commerce.106 
Requiring the regulated activity to “substantially affect” 
rather than just to “affect” interstate commerce more narrowly 
construes and limits the reach of the “affecting commerce” test, 
and hence narrows the reach of the “interstate commerce” power, 
because to “substantially affect” something is more difficult than 
merely to “affect it.”107 This is on top of the fact that, as discussed 
more fully below, measuring effects—substantial or not—on 
“interstate commerce” generally means measuring the effect that 
something inside a state has on an activity at the state border 
rather than on other activity inside a state, which is already 
arguably more restrictive of the power. In turn, the latter could 
require a longer reach of the “affecting commerce” test—i.e., the 
 
 106. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558–59 (emphasis added). 
 107. Lopez also required that the activity must be “economic.” Id. at 560. But see 
criticism of Rehnquist’s anachronistic conception of what is “economic” in Conrad J. 
Weiler, Jr., “Explaining the Original Intent of Lopez to the Framers: Or, the Framers Spoke 
Like Us, Didn’t They”?, 16 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y, 163 (2004) [hereinafter Weiler, 
Explaining]. 
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necessary and proper clause—than what would be required under 
what we argue is the actual meaning of “among the several 
states,”108 because the latter may already locate the commerce 
that can be regulated inside states. Thus whatever affects 
“commerce among the states” might already be quite close by 
inside a state, while an effect on “interstate commerce” must be 
measured to the mathematical line of the state border. 
Related to that point, Rehnquist’s Lopez opinion, like 
McKenna’s, Hughes’s, and Stone’s before him, referred to a form 
of the term “mingle” to justify extending the “interstate 
commerce” power, 109 apparently also like them, unaware of using 
the very term that defined “among” in the first place with no need 
for any extending corollaries. In paraphrasing the 1914 Shreveport 
Rate Cases, Rehnquist said “the Court held that, where the 
interstate and intrastate aspects of commerce were so mingled 
together that full regulation of interstate commerce required 
incidental regulation of intrastate commerce, the Commerce 
Clause authorized such regulation.”110 In this and the other 
instances a form of “mingle” was applied in support of a 
commerce-extending doctrine under the necessary and proper 
clause to overcome the artificial narrowing of the power caused 
by imposition of the anachronistic interstate-intrastate 
dichotomy, even though the “mingle” meaning was already 
arguably contained in the first place within the meaning of the 
word “among” in the actual language of the Constitution, and 
commerce power-extending doctrines might not even be needed. 
In its recurring use of versions of “mingled” as if it were a helpful 
new gloss to justify extending the “interstate commerce power,” 
the Court is perhaps subconsciously recognizing the same reality 
of the need to reach inside states that the Framers (and Marshall) 
explicitly did in the first place when they wrote “among the 
several states” instead of “between the states.” 
Justice Thomas concurred in Lopez, making a very strong 
conservative originalist argument for cutting back the commerce 
clause even more than the majority opinion had. But his 
originalism was perhaps more conservative than originalist, since 
after calling for a return to the original meaning of the 
Constitution and suggesting on originalist grounds that many 
 
 108. See supra pp. 435–36 and infra Part IV.E. 
 109. Supra, pp. 435–36 459, 462, 468–69, and note 13. 
 110. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 554 (emphasis added). 
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more laws be overturned as exceeding the commerce power,111 
Thomas used the term “interstate commerce” a total of thirty-two 
times. To be sure, many of his mentions were quotes from other 
cases as he argued that the “affecting commerce test” was 
improper, but he never expressed any criticism of the use of 
“interstate commerce” and seemed completely unaware of its 
“unoriginalism.” Confirming this point, Thomas anachronistically 
added in rejecting the “affecting commerce” test that “the 
Framers could have drafted a Constitution that contained a 
‘substantially affects interstate commerce’ clause had that been 
their objective.”112 This is all the more ironic as elsewhere in the 
same concurrence Thomas utilized Dr. Johnson’s 1773 Dictionary 
to give a very selective reading of the supposed original meaning 
of “commerce,”113 and completely (and inconsistently) 
overlooked the absence from that Dictionary of “interstate.”114 
But the larger point is that Justice Thomas apparently considered 
“interstate commerce” in its narrow sense to actually be the 
equivalent of what the Framers understood as “commerce . . . 
among the several states,” and thus vulnerable to attack for being 
overextended inside states via the “affecting commerce” test. 115 
But while the “interstate commerce” power might arguably be 
overextended, if “among the several states” is actually broader 
than “interstate,” as we have argued, the power over commerce 
among the several states could reach much of what Justice 
Thomas rejects even without an affecting commerce test. 
 
 111. “[O]ur case law has drifted far from the original understanding of the Commerce 
Clause. In a future case, we ought to temper our Commerce Clause jurisprudence in a 
manner that both makes sense of our more recent case law and is more faithful to the 
original understanding of that Clause.” Id. at 584. 
 112. Id. at 588 (emphasis added). See infra pp. 494–96. 
 113. Selective, because in concluding that “commerce” meant “selling, buying, and 
bartering, as well as transporting for these purposes,” Thomas first quoted Dr. Johnson’s 
full definition of “commerce:” “‘[i]ntercour[s]e; exchange of one thing for another; 
interchange of any thing; trade; traffick,’” but his analysis skipped right over “intercourse.” 
Arguably, analyzing “intercourse” would have made arguing for Thomas’s narrow “selling 
and buying” definition of “commerce” more difficult. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 585–86. 
 114. Inconsistent use of dictionaries is not unknown in originalist analyses. See supra, 
note 12. 
 115. Following Lopez, United States v. Morrison affirmed to the 
conservative/originalist movement that Lopez was not a fluke. 529 U.S. 598 (2000); 
AMANDA HOLLIS-BRUSKY, IDEAS WITH CONSEQUENCES: THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY 
AND THE CONSERVATIVE COUNTERREVOLUTION, 112, 151 (2015). In Morrison 
Rehnquist’s majority opinion used “interstate commerce” 36 times, and the actual 
language of the Constitution once.  
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2. “Interstate Commerce” in the Legal Academy and Beyond 
a. Early Writers 
Though here we can only review a tiny sampling of how the 
legal literature has treated the “interstate commerce power,” with 
a few prominent exceptions, “interstate commerce” seems to have 
been fully accepted as the working language for analyzing the 
constitutional power over commerce in the legal community and 
beyond within less than a generation of its 1869 introduction and 
continues to be so today. This is generally true even among most 
originalists, especially among many who argue for narrow 
interpretations of the power. 
Among pre-New Deal writers with a narrow interpretation 
of the power, for example, Robert E. Cushman’s 1919 article, 
“The Police Power Under the Commerce Clause” criticized those 
who would broaden the commerce power beyond its then narrow 
interpretation, though he argued that it already had a broad 
interpretation, and portrayed the power Congress had recently 
begun exercising over food and drugs and railroad safety as an 
improper exercise of a federal police power.116 He uncritically and 
frequently used the term “interstate” as though it were the 
original language of the Constitution, and gave it the narrow 
“between” meaning. For example, he quite anachronistically said 
that “perhaps the most important cause for the formation and 
adoption of our federal constitution was the desire to establish a 
government with power to regulate foreign and interstate 
commerce. . . .”117 Later he wrote about “congressional 
responsibility for the safe, free, uninterrupted flow of commerce 
between the states . . . .”118 Similarly, in a 1932 book on the 
commerce clause, Professor Gavit wrote that “prior to the 
adoption of the Constitution the phrase “interstate and foreign 
commerce” had no particular legal significance.”119 This is 
indisputably correct since the word “interstate” did not yet exist, 
but this stunningly anachronistic statement from an expert shows 
how completely the legal community had convinced itself within 
 
 116. Robert E. Cushman, The Police Power Under the Commerce Clause, 3 MINN. L. 
REV. 289 (1919). 
 117. Id. at 309.  
 118. Id. at 319 (emphasis added). 
 119. BERNARD C. GAVIT, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE OF THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION, 100 (1932). 
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a few years of the introduction of “the interstate commerce 
power” that it was the constitutional power. Even Albert Abel, in 
what was in many ways a thorough and originalist, though also 
conservative, analysis of the origins of the power to regulate 
commerce among the states, frequently used “interstate 
commerce” and “between the states” as the equivalent of the 
actual language of the Constitution.120 For example, in surveying 
the documents of the Framing era, he says “[t]he only thing 
approaching a full discussion of the power over interstate 
commerce is found in The Federalist, where it was touched on 
three times . . . .”121 Of course, The Federalist never discussed 
“interstate commerce.” Elsewhere Abel paraphrased a Framer’s 
words that literally said “among the several states” as “between 
the states.”122 These early discussions demonstrate “interstate 
commerce’s” early dominance and narrow embodiment of the 
power over commerce, and show how long and often both the 
Court and the legal community have convinced themselves that 
“interstate commerce” is actually the language as well as the 
meaning of the Constitution. 
Even Professor Corwin, who also claimed in 1936 to be 
interpreting the original understanding, while arriving at what 
today would be considered “liberal” conclusions that the 
commerce power was very broad and reached insides states, 
frequently and uncritically used the term “interstate commerce” 
even while arguing against several of the Court’s commerce-
narrowing doctrines. While he never explicitly discussed the 
meanings of “between” versus “among” or “interstate,” he clearly 
argued that the power to regulate commerce among the several 
states could go inside states. So his use of “interstate commerce” 
did not carry the “between” meaning, but so far as we can tell he 
is the only scholar before recent years to examine original 
evidence who regularly used the term “interstate commerce” 
 
 120. See Albert S. Abel, The Commerce Clause in the Constitutional Convention and 
in Contemporary Comment, 25 MINN. L. REV. 432 (1941). 
 121. Id. at 473. 
 122. Sherman, enumerating the main functions of the federal government, lists the 
duties “‘to preserve . . . a beneficial intercourse among themselves [the states”], . . .’ The 
language is interesting; the beneficial intercourse between the states was merely to be 
preserved” . . . .” The italics are added to show how Abel deftly and perhaps unconsciously 
reduced Sherman’s “among” to “between” so as to support his own general thesis. Id. at 
473 (emphasis added). 
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while arguing broadly for a power to go inside states.123 A year 
later, the soon to be Justice, Professor Felix Frankfurter, also an 
advocate of broad application of the power over commerce 
among the states, wrote anachronistically regarding Justice 
Taney, saying he “furthered his general policy of giving restrictive 
scope to the Commerce Clause by narrowing the conception of 
interstate commerce[,]” and emphasized the “geographical 
dichotomy between state and interstate commerce.”124 This 
reinforces our point above about Taney’s narrow dual federalist 
views of the power over commerce,125 but also shows that even 
before joining the Court, Frankfurter already conceptualized the 
power in the Constitution to be the “interstate commerce” power 
contrasting with apparent “intrastate” power. 
But a few broad commerce power advocates in and after the 
1930s did argue that “interstate commerce” was being used to 
convey an improperly narrow meaning of the power over 
commerce among the states. In 1937 Hamilton and Adair’s major 
critique of narrow views of the commerce power briefly 
mentioned the “interstate” theory, pointing out that the word 
“interstate” did not exist at the Founding, and that the use of 
“interstate commerce” instead of “among” contributed to an idea 
of “separation of dominions between state and nation” that did 
not exist regarding commerce at the Framing.126 But apparently 
the only extended criticism of the use of “interstate” and the 
results of substituting it for “among the states” was by Crosskey. 
Crosskey heavily criticized what he called “the interstate theory” 
of the commerce power, or “the interstate limitation,” i.e., “the 
moving of persons, things, and intelligence, from the territory of 
one state to the territory of another.”127 He attributed its rise to the 
pre-Civil War effort beginning with Taney to narrow the power 
over commerce so that it would not threaten states’ rights, and 
presumably slavery, and then its adaptation after the Civil War 
 
 123. See generally, CORWIN, supra note 21, at Chs. 5–6, 171–72, 209.  
 124. FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE POWER UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY 
AND WAITE, 59–60 (Quadrangle Paperbacks 1964) (1937) (emphasis added). 
 125. Supra pp. 437–38. 
 126. WALTON H. HAMILTON & DOUGLASS ADAIR, THE POWER TO GOVERN: THE 
CONSTITUTION—THEN AND NOW, 142 (1937). Stern earlier briefly also noted how 
“interstate” narrowed the understanding of the power, but undertook no analysis. Robert 
L. Stern, That Commerce Which Concerns More States Than One, 47 HARV. L REV. 1335, 
1348 (1934). 
 127. CROSSKEY, supra note 6 at 17–19. Curiously he did not comment on interstate’s 
post-constitutional origins. 
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into the “interstate theory” by a Court increasingly committed to 
laissez-faire policies.128 
But despite the Court’s narrow phrasing of the power over 
commerce among the several states as “interstate,” Crosskey 
agreed that it had nonetheless extended the power over 
commerce inside states through doctrines such as the direct-
indirect doctrine of Knight,129 or later, as in Jones and Laughlin,130 
based on whether something substantially affected interstate 
commerce, even if not defined as commerce at all. However, 
Crosskey thought these doctrines would not have been necessary 
if the Court had stayed with the original broad understanding of 
the power over commerce among the several states, and were 
possibly not themselves even constitutional, but they had evolved 
because of the need to get around the confines of the “interstate 
doctrine.” Otherwise, without these compensating doctrines, he 
argued, under the interstate theory, virtually everything inside a 
state was “intrastate,” and, going back to Taney, left to the state 
to regulate. 
Crosskey concluded that these corollary “interstate 
commerce”—extending doctrines did not reach what he believed 
to be the full extent of the power over commerce—but that was 
because he defined “commerce” as “all gainful activity” inside 
states and states as the people of the states.131 While we do not 
agree that “commerce” was so broadly understood,132 nor that 
“states” were not governmental units, those points are beyond the 
scope of this article. We do think Crosskey correctly argued that 
the general embrace of the “interstate theory” forced the Court 
to adopt a variety of corollary rationales when it wanted to extend 
the commerce power inside states beyond its “interstate” 
limitation.133 After all, if the power to regulate commerce among 
the several states could go inside states to regulate “that 
commerce which affects more states than one,” as Marshall said, 
even if the commerce did not itself move across state lines, then 
 
 128. CROSSKEY, supra note 6, at 47, 287–88. As did CORWIN, supra note 21, at 131, 
257–58, as well as many others. 
 129. Supra pp. 456–57. 
 130. Supra pp. 464–65. 
 131. CROSSKEY, supra note 6, at 50–55. 
 132. For one, the Framers distinguished between “commerce” and “economy,” both 
of which described “gainful” activities, but only the former was understood to be subject 
to regulation. See Weiler, Explaining, supra note 107, at 173–76, 182–93. 
 133. CROSSKEY, supra note 6, at 18.  
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the affecting commerce test is not needed, or is not needed as 
much. Nor does one need a “stream” or “current of commerce,” 
nor a “close and substantial relation to interstate commerce,”134 
to reach inside a state, if “among” already means to go inside a 
state to those activities which are mingled with those activities 
that concern more states than one. 
Since Crosskey, however, there seems to have been little 
academic examination of the continuing substitution of 
“interstate commerce” for “commerce among the several states,” 
and the term’s use is either normally taken for granted, or (in our 
opinion properly) used as the equivalent of “between,” which in 
turn is often (in our opinion improperly) argued to be the actual 
meaning of “among the several states.”135 
b. Modern Writers 
In recent decades, Raoul Berger, a founder of modern 
conservative originalism,136 concluded that “among” meant 
“between,” partly based on such evidence as the fact that the 
Framers themselves sometimes used “between,” and the idea that 
the Framers intended only to stop obstacles to trade at state 
borders.137 After accusing Chief Justice Marshall of an 
“importation” of the meaning of “commerce” in Gibbons,138 
Berger ironically and self-servingly then himself imported 
“interstate commerce” and “between” into the rest of his chapter 
on the commerce power.139 “Undoubtedly Congress has power to 
govern commerce between the States . . . . Nor was the inter-state 
grant all-embracing.” Similarly with Bork and Troy, the late Judge 
Bork being another progenitor of contemporary modern 
conservative originalism who also regularly and uncritically used 
the term “interstate commerce” while expounding the Framers’ 
original understanding of commerce. For example, in discussing 
 
 134. See supra pp. 460, 464. 
 135. The examples are legion, we have cited only a few prominent examples. 
 136. JOHNATHAN O’NEILL, ORIGINALISM IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS 129–
32 (2005). Though some of Berger’s methods are now rejected by some modern originalists 
as not properly focused on the “original understanding,” their conclusions regarding 
commerce are often the same as his.  
 137. RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS’ DESIGN 126–33 (1987). See 
supra text pp. 451–455 and accompanying notes regarding the Framers’ use of “among” 
and “between.”  
 138. BERGER, supra note 137, at 124. 
 139. E.g., BERGER, supra note 137, at 123, 132, 133, 135, 136, 138, 140, 144, 145, 156. 
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the meaning of the power over commerce among the states, they 
anachronistically call it “interstate commerce” and correctly but 
largely irrelevantly equate the latter to “between”: “[i]nterstate 
commerce seems to refer to interstate trade—that is, . . . 
‘transportation, purchase, sale and exchange of commodities 
between the . . . citizens of different states.’”140 But the real 
question is not whether “interstate” is similar to “between,” which 
it unquestionably is, but what is the meaning of “among.” 
The modern libertarian originalist Richard Epstein also 
seems to follow the “interstate theory,” though his primary focus 
is on the supposedly overbroad definition of “commerce,” 
beginning in the Progressive Era. He anachronistically says 
regarding Gibbons that “Marshall decided . . . that navigation 
among the several states was interstate commerce,”141 and quotes 
Marshall’s statement about leaving to the states that commerce 
which is “completely internal,” but like many conservatives leaves 
off Marshall’s qualifying phrase at the sentence’s end, “and which 
does not extend to or affect other states.” Moreover, Epstein’s 
general discussion heavily employs the language of interstate 
commerce and the “interstate-intrastate” distinction. Regarding 
the necessary and proper clause, he ties it to “interstate 
commerce” by saying that it “permits the regulation of local 
affairs that are in a sense inseparable from national ones, as 
happens when local and interstate cars, for example, move along 
the same line.”142 Of course, the meaning of “among” is “mingled 
with,” which “local and interstate cars. . . along the same line” 
would seem to exemplify with no further qualification, so that 
arguably Epstein’s approach like others would require the 
necessary and proper clause to reach that which “among the 
several states” already reaches unaided as an original and textual 
matter. 
Another example of how deeply entrenched is the belief that 
the Constitution has the “between” meaning is shown by two 
writers praising Justice Thomas’s narrow view of the power over 
commerce in Lopez. They say that under Justice Thomas’s view 
“the power ‘to regulate Commerce . . . among the several States’ 
 
 140. Robert H. Bork & Daniel E. Troy, Locating the Boundaries: The Scope of 
Congress’s Power to Regulate Commerce, 25 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 849, 863–64 (2002) 
(emphasis added).  
 141. Epstein, supra note 77, at 1401 (emphasis added). 
 142. Epstein, supra note 77, at 1398. 
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would be interpreted to cover only what the Constitution literally 
says: “the power to regulate commerce (buying and selling things) 
across state lines.”143 Of course, what the Constitution literally says 
is not “across state lines” but “among the several states,” and 
whether the latter only means “across state lines” is very much the 
issue, but this exemplifies again the deep-seated and apparently 
unconscious assumption even among scholars that “among” not 
only means but actually is written as “interstate” or “between.” 
In contrast, Randy Barnett, a leading original understanding 
originalist, largely avoids the term “interstate commerce,” 
instead, assimilating “among the several states” to “between the 
several states” based on originalist evidence.144 But even though 
he focuses on transmuting “among” into “between” to reach 
narrow conclusions, as opposed to those who argue that the 
neologism “interstate commerce” has been extended too far, that 
is exactly the point. Barnett still has the initial (and in our opinion 
heavy) burden of proving in the final analysis along with Abel, 
Berger, and others that “among” means “between,”145 despite the 
fact that the Constitution says “among,” not “between.” 
An overview of the modern conservative original 
understanding of the Constitution is presented in The Heritage 
Guide to the Constitution. Regarding commerce among the 
several states it generously acknowledges Marshall’s “inside a 
state” view of “among,” but says “some commentators have 
defined ‘among the several states’ as the trading and movement 
of goods between two or more states. . .” 146 Obviously, the latter 
point refers to the narrow “interstate” meaning of “among “ 
argued and accepted by most conservatives (as discussed above) 
as the true meaning of “among,”147 and The Guide’s discussion 
itself mentions “interstate commerce” about four times as often 
 
 143. David B. Kopel & Glenn H. Reynolds, Taking Federalism Seriously: Lopez and 
the Partial Birth Abortion Act, 30 CONN. L. REV. 59, 75 (1997) (emphasis added). See supra 
p. 492 for Justice Thomas’s view. 
 144. Barnett, Original Meaning, supra note 14, at 132–36, citing Framing era use of 
“between” as evidence of the actual and understood meaning of “among.” See supra note 
16. 
 145. A burden which, in our opinion, has not been met, though that issue is largely 
beyond the scope of this paper. However, we did touch briefly on it, supra pp. 434–36, 476–
79, and note 13, and infra pp. 482–83. 
 146. Forte, supra note 101, at 102 (emphasis added). On Marshall’s view see supra pp. 
451–54. 
 147. See Part IV.D.1, IV.D.2.a and IV.D.2.b to p. 482. 
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as the actual constitutional language.148 Additionally, a recent 
sympathetic historian of conservative originalism criticized the 
New Deal Court’s “logic of the living Constitution” for 
abandoning “categorical distinctions arguably related to the text 
and original intent of the Commerce Clause” such as “whether 
commerce was interstate or intrastate.”149 But if making up new 
words and distinctions such as “interstate” versus “intrastate” and 
calling them the Constitution is originalist, it makes one wonder 
what real difference there is between “originalism” and the long 
castigated conservative straw man of “living constitutionalism.” 
Recent originalist scholars who conclude that the power over 
commerce among the several states was a broad power, like 
Corwin earlier, do not confront “interstate commerce.” For 
example, while Nelson and Pushaw do not directly say that the 
meaning of “among the several states” was to go inside states, 
they extensively quote Marshall’s language in Gibbons defining 
“among” as applying to “that commerce which concerns more 
states than one,” and cite an array of programs inside states that 
they argue is justified by the power.150 We think that they correctly 
conclude that the Gibbons Court “recognized that Congress could 
regulate wholly intrastate commerce . . . if it was connected with 
commerce in at least one other state.”151 But in accepting the 
actual meaning that we argue “among” already had as expressed 
in the “affecting more states than one” principle, by using 
 
 148. Forte, supra note 101, at 101–07. 
 149. O’NEILL, ORIGINALISM, supra note 136, at 34–35. In broadly arguing that 
Holmesian legal realism eventually resulted in “living constitutionalism” by overturning 
the formal and categorical distinctions of the Knight Court, O’Neill makes the 
questionable assumption, at least regarding commerce, that categorical distinctions of pre-
New Deal courts such as “interstate-intrastate” were somehow more originalist than the 
New Deal Court’s decisions. Cushman similarly traces the rise and fall of formalistic 
categories, with an excellent analysis of Justice Jackson wrestling with the problem of 
extending the “interstate commerce” clause to local consumption in Wickard. See Barry 
Cushman, Formalism and Realism in Commerce Clause Jurisprudence, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1089 (2000). He concludes that “[t]he anachronism of studying doctrinal development 
through the categories comprising the modern constitutional sensibility only compounds 
the error” of tracing doctrine topically instead of synchronically. Id. at 1149. But Cushman 
misses the bigger chronicity problem by failing to examine the underlying linguistic 
problems and resultant doctrinal issues inherent in the Court’s equating “interstate 
commerce” with “commerce . . . among the several states” and trying to regulate commerce 
among the several states under the “interstate-intrastate” dichotomy.  
 150. See Grant S. Nelson & Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Rethinking the Commerce Clause: 
Applying First Principles to Uphold Federal Commercial Regulations but Preserve State 
Control Over Social Issues, 85 IOWA L. Rev. 1 (1999). 
 151. Id. at 60 (emphasis added). 
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“intrastate,” they perhaps inadvertently invoke the “interstate-
intrastate” distinction. Though they would still uphold the vast 
majority of commerce power legislation under the “substantially 
affecting commerce” test, they think it too broad.152 It is thus not 
clear if their conclusion that the substantial effects test is too 
broad is affected by their apparent conceptualization of “among 
the several states” in terms of the narrow interstate-intrastate 
dichotomy. 
Jack Balkin also applies originalist tools to conclude that the 
power over commerce among the states was originally understood 
to be a broad power. He agrees that in Gibbons Marshall ruled 
that regulation could reach inside a state, even to activity not 
crossing a state line, but argues that in dictum regarding the 
inspection clause Marshall limited the power over production, 
though Balkin’s own reading of original sources based on the 
Virginia Resolution would allow for a very broad reach of the 
power inside states.153 Perhaps because of this, Balkin does not 
focus on the use of “interstate” versus “among.” Douglas Kmiec 
also relies on the Virginia Resolution, and argues that it justifies 
a broad “inside” meaning of “among the several states.” While he 
largely uses the language of “interstate commerce,” and while 
critical of the “substantially affecting commerce” test, he would 
extend federal power inside states to reach commercial activity 
where there is a national purpose or the states were separately 
incompetent.154 
Constitutional law texts also seem to accept the dominance 
of “interstate commerce.” Gunther and Sullivan somewhat 
neutrally entitled their chapter on the power to regulate 
commerce “The Commerce Power,” but in the opening sentence 
of the introduction said “[a] national regulatory power over 
interstate commerce was a major motivation for the framing of the 
Constitution. . . .”155 Lawrence Tribe headed his discussion of the 
power over commerce among the states as “The Power to 
Regulate Interstate Commerce. . . .”156 
 
 152. Id. at 158. 
 153. BALKIN, supra note 4, at 140–49, 180. 
 154. See Douglas W. Kmiec, Rediscovering a Principled Commerce Power, 28 PEPP. 
L. REV. 547 (2001). 
 155. KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 119 
(14th ed., 2001) (emphasis added). 
 156. 1 LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 807 (3rd ed. 2000). 
Political Science, the most frequent undergraduate major for law students, also generally 
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In sum, for the first eighty years of its existence the Supreme 
Court largely used the literal or near-literal original language of 
the middle part of Article I, sec. 8, Clause 3 of the Constitution, 
“commerce . . . among the several states,” in dealing with the 
regulation of domestic commerce, though as also noted above, the 
Court also but less frequently referred to “commerce between the 
states,” a phrase with an arguably narrower meaning. The 
occasional use of “between,” which might have been quite 
appropriate to the facts of individual cases, changed very rapidly 
however, with the Court’s discovery and embrace of the term 
“interstate” in 1869, a term that arguably meant the same thing as 
“between the several states.” The Court increasingly applied 
“interstate” to all challenges to the application of the national 
commerce power, especially challenges to the rising tide of federal 
legislation beginning in the late 1800s, itself increasingly based on 
the “interstate commerce” power. From the very moment of its 
introduction into a majority opinion in 1869, which seemed to 
legitimate its use, the term “interstate commerce” ascended, 
within two decades swamping use of the actual language of the 
Constitution, and continuing its dominance right up to the 
present. Since its introduction, “interstate commerce,” often 
paired with “intrastate,” has been used voluntarily or mostly so by 
the Court in over two thousand cases for a total of over eleven 
thousand uses, far more than the actual language of the 
Constitution, so that for all practical purposes “interstate 
commerce” is the working language of the Court regarding the 
power in question, generally conveying a narrower meaning that 
is arguably required by the Constitution. Even while making 
major doctrinal changes, the Court has remained within the 
language of “interstate commerce,” relying on commerce-
extending doctrines to expand the reach of the power inside 
states. Thus, for most of the existence of the Constitution, and 
during essentially all of the time that Congress has actively 
regulated commerce among the states, the power to regulate 
 
refers to this part of the Constitution as “the interstate commerce power.” For example, 
KAREN O’CONNOR & LARRY J. SABATO, AMERICAN GOVERNMENT: CONTINUITY AND 
CHANGE (2004) which described itself as “best-selling,” on p. 77, anachronistically 
discussed Gibbons as construing the power over “interstate commerce.” Also, their index 
cited “interstate commerce,” and virtually all such texts do this. The examples in academe 
generally of the dominance of “interstate commerce” are legion; the term is ubiquitous 
and widely accepted as the meaning if not the actual language of the Constitution without 
a second thought.  
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commerce among the several states has been conceptualized and 
dealt with by the courts as the “interstate commerce power.” 
Within the legal community generally, originalist or not, and 
whether reaching broad or narrow conclusions, “interstate 
commerce” has so permeated the legal (and popular) mind that 
for well over a century the assumption apparently has been that 
the two phrases—the actual language of the Constitution, and 
“interstate commerce”—are identical in (an often narrow) 
meaning, and that “interstate commerce” is the proper term by 
which to describe and interpret the relevant constitutional 
language. The legal community generally relies on the term to 
convey the meaning of the regulation of commerce among the 
several states, often in a more narrow way than we argue is 
warranted by the actual meaning of “among the several states.” 
Within the legal community, while the Federalist Society has 
actively developed much of the intellectual capital and contact 
network supporting the conservative turn on the Supreme Court 
in the last few decades, and conservatives have carefully 
developed a narrower and often “originalist” interpretation of the 
power over commerce among the several states to oppose the 
broader interpretations of the liberals and “living 
constitutionalists,”157 their own discourse and their opposition to 
“living constitutionalists” (as well as the discourse of the latter) 
ironically still occur largely within the anachronistic and 
unoriginal linguistic framework of “interstate commerce.” 158 
Thus the fact of the overwhelming dominance for well over a 
century of the term “interstate commerce” in legal and popular 
discussions of the federal power over commerce among the 
several states is unquestionable. The main questions are why this 
change, and, most important, whether it makes any important 
difference, points to which we now turn. 
 
 157. HOLLIS-BRUSKY, supra note 115, at 96–103. It is also an interesting question as 
to how “originalist” a set of interpretations carefully constructed by a political movement 
two centuries after the fact to serve current policy goals can truly be. 
 158. Although in itself this is not unknown with other parts of the Constitution; see 
supra note 1 regarding reliance on Jefferson’s “wall of separation between church and 
state” rather than the actual language of the Establishment Clause, but our concern is with 
the lack of recognition that such a change has occurred. 
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E. Why Did the Court Adopt “Interstate Commerce” in 1869, 
but Not Drop it in 1937 (or 1995)? 
As to why the Court first turned to “interstate commerce,” 
we should first consider whether it was largely a result of litigation 
over language in legislation using “interstate commerce.” While 
statutory litigation has greatly added to the mentions of 
“interstate commerce” in Court cases, as discussed above, we 
have removed most such references from our data, the bulk of 
which concerned the Interstate Commerce Act,159 so legislation 
does not account for the Court’s overwhelming use of the term in 
place of the actual constitutional language as shown above in 
Tables 1 and 2. Moreover, the Court itself adopted the term 
“interstate commerce” in 1869, eighteen years before the passage 
of the first national legislation to use the term, the Interstate 
Commerce Act,160 and another five years before the Court’s first 
case involving the Act, in 1892. In those twenty-three years, the 
Court used the term “interstate commerce” entirely on its own in 
93 majority opinions, for a total of 325 uses in those opinions, 
while using “commerce among the several states” in 94 majority 
opinions, a total of 273 times. This suggests that, if anything, the 
causality might be the reverse, with the Court’s adoption of 
“interstate commerce” promoting its use by Congress and the 
general public. Moreover, after the Court introduced the term 
“interstate commerce,” in 1869, the rate of use of “commerce 
among the several states” immediately decreased, before any 
litigation came to the Court involving “interstate commerce” in 
legislation, as shown above in Table 1, and by the decade 1910–
1919 the rate of usage of the language of the Constitution was less 
than two times per opinion and has remained at that level since. 
And since the 1990’s, the constitutional language has been 
mentioned less than only one and a third times per case that 
mentioned it at all, which was not nearly as many times as cases 
mentioning “interstate commerce.” So there definitely seems to 
have been and still is a strong preference by the Court for 
“interstate commerce” regardless of legislation. 
But given the Court’s already existing generally narrow 
interpretation of the power over commerce among the several 
states in 1869, when the Court adopted “interstate commerce,” 
 
 159. Supra Part III.D. 
 160. Woodruff v. Parham, 75 U.S. 123, 137 (1869).  
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there was less to the linguistic change than meets the eye. In other 
words, the Court did not change doctrine by adopting “interstate 
commerce” so much as simply rename and increasingly emphasize 
the preexisting narrow commerce power doctrine it had largely 
followed since the late 1830s. 
Perhaps as puzzling as why the Court adopted “interstate 
commerce” in the first place is why it did not replace the term in 
the “constitutional revolution” of 1937 when it greatly expanded 
the reach of the power over commerce among the states. Certainly 
some scholars were already criticizing the Court’s narrow 
interpretation of the power over commerce among the several 
states as expressed through the “interstate” theory, as noted 
above.161 So if ever there were a time to change terminology to 
mark a major change in direction, this was it. Moreover, the Court 
could have justified its change in direction by reverting to the 
original language of the Constitution and arguing that it was 
merely returning to original meaning of the Constitution.162 But 
instead the Court actually intensified its reliance on “interstate 
commerce,” applying broad commerce power-extending 
doctrines to justify expansion of the power. Perhaps the Court 
lacked the scholarly capital it might have needed to return to the 
original language and to give it a broad meaning, or itself doubted 
that the original meaning was broad enough to support where the 
Court wanted to go.163 Or perhaps it felt that it was making enough 
of a substantive change in direction in 1937 without also calling 
more attention to that change by making a major change in the 
language that the country had become accustomed to, however 
anachronistic that language was, in a kind of verbal path-
dependency that partially concealed enormous actual change.164 
 
 161. See pp. 476–79 above for contemporary scholarly criticism of the Court. There 
was also strong criticism from the President, Congress and the public. O’BRIEN, supra note 
42, at 60–68, 573–74. It might also be asked why the Court did not revert to the actual 
constitutional language in its early 1900s decisions, outlined above at  Part IV.B, when it 
first began to develop its commerce power extending doctrines, and when the adoption of 
“interstate commerce” language was still in living memory. 
 162. In his speech introducing his “Court-packing plan,” Roosevelt argued that the 
Court should “enforce the Constitution as written.” O’BRIEN, supra note 42, at 62–63.  
 163. Though Hollis-Brusky argues that there was significant legal intellectual capital 
to draw upon in the New Deal era to support expanding the reach of the power over 
commerce, as reviewed above, that literature also largely expressed itself as dealing with 
“interstate commerce.” See supra Part IV.C and HOLLIS-BRUSKY, supra note 115, at 165–
66. 
 164. Hollis-Brusky and others correctly note that there is a strong tendency toward 
path-dependency in Court jurisprudence. HOLLIS-BRUSKY, supra note 115, at 149–51. 
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Also puzzling is why, in 1995, when the Lopez Court made 
the first real limitation in Commerce Clause doctrine since 1937—
and did so moreover while claiming to represent “first principles” 
atop a rising tide of conservative originalism—the Court 
continued to discourse in the distinctly unoriginal language of 
“interstate commerce” and “intrastate.” Perhaps the simplest 
answer is that no one cared or noticed. A more cynical answer 
might be that in Lopez practical conservatism outweighed 
theoretical originalism, perhaps because too frankly opening up 
the can of worms of the actual original meaning of “among the 
several states” and the “interstate” doctrine might confuse things 
and pose more problems for conservatives than solutions, since it 
is much easier for conservatives to argue, as already discussed, 
that the “interstate commerce power” has been overly extended 
by the “affecting commerce” test to reach inside states than to 
argue that “among” means “between” and does not of its own 
meaning reach inside states.165 
In sum, for whatever reason, through major changes in how 
the Court applies it, for well over a century the Court has 
voluntarily continued to use the term “interstate commerce” far 
more than it has used the actual language of the Constitution. 
F. So What? Implications of Reliance on the Interstate 
Commerce Power 
Despite Lopez and what we argue is the narrow bias of 
“interstate commerce,” as actually applied and with the help of 
various extending doctrines based on the necessary and proper 
clause, the modern “interstate commerce” power is still broad,166 
and arguably corresponds roughly in practice to what we argue 
was Marshall’s view and evidence of the original understanding of 
“commerce among the several states.”167 However, there are still 
 
However, here we would distinguish between path-dependency in continuation of 
doctrinal language, and path-dependency in the actual application of the doctrine. While 
path-dependency may be the best explanation for the continuation of the words and the 
fundamental “between” concept of the “interstate commerce” doctrine, obviously its 
application through the various corollary doctrines we outlined above has varied since the 
1890’s. Path-dependency also does not explain the rapid but apparently completely 
unquestioned adoption of “interstate commerce” in the first place. 
 165. Supra pp. 435–36; see generally Part IV.C, and infra p. 490. 
 166. See generally, Kmiec, supra note 154. 
 167. Obviously, many conservatives and some originalists will disagree with our 
conclusions and continue to argue for greater limits on the power over commerce, but 
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legal and policy reasons for concern about the all-pervasive 
dominance of “the interstate commerce power.” 
First, to be sure, the Court had developed commerce power 
narrowing doctrines well before it adopted “interstate 
commerce.” However, especially when paired with “intrastate,” 
“interstate commerce” became its own self-limiting text and 
doctrine, because the words themselves so clearly and strongly 
conveyed the narrow meaning of only crossing state boundaries. 
If “interstate commerce” is the language and meaning of the 
Constitution, nothing more is needed to define federal power as 
limited to crossing state boundaries, at least without assistance 
from the necessary and proper clause. In contrast, while “among 
the several states” is not as self-evidently clear in its meaning, it is 
also not on its face literally or clearly limited to crossing state 
lines, and arguably extends inside more states than one. Thus, to 
the considerable extent that “interstate” and “intrastate 
commerce” have replaced the actual words of the Constitution on 
the Court and in the public mind, these neologisms facially 
privilege a narrow understanding of the power in the Constitution 
in a way that earlier or other limiting doctrines did not. The 
general acceptance and unquestioning use of such language not 
just as doctrine but as if it were the literal words of the 
Constitution cements a narrow view of the power in the public 
mind far more effectively than if the Court had to struggle with 
elaborate and obscure explanations of how “among” in the 
Constitution really meant “between,” especially in the face of its 
rejection by Marshall in Gibbons,168 or with Tenth Amendment 
arguments about how principles of federalism prohibit regulating 
activity inside states even if it is of national economic 
importance.169 In sum, the originalist and linguistic case that 
“among” really means “between” is neither self-evident nor as 
facially strong as the argument that “interstate” means 
“between.” And though obviously this is and will be disputed, that 
 
hopefully without relying on interstate or intrastate commerce. See Justice Thomas’s view, 
supra note 113 and accompanying text. See also supra  Part IV.C.1.  
 168. In RESTORING, Barnett very briefly reviews and rejects Marshall’s interpretation 
of “among” in Gibbons and does not consider it at all in Original Meaning. RESTORING, 
supra note 14, at 301–02, and Original Meaning, supra note 14 at 132–36. As noted supra 
note 14, he also did not consider Dr. Johnson’s definition of “among.” 
 169. To be sure, it is sometimes argued that the Tenth Amendment limits federal 
power to specific (though unwritten) functions or that certain functions are specifically left 
to the states. 
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is exactly the point-the meaning of the actual constitutional 
language is readily arguable to be much broader than its 
anachronistic gloss. 
Thus, if we are debating the meaning of “among,” especially 
as originalists, the initial burden is on those who want to prove 
that “among” means “between” instead of “mingled with,” or “on 
every side,” and to explain why the text of the Constitution did 
not just say “between,” if that was the meaning.170 Then they must 
account for the neologisms “interstate” and “intrastate,” which 
did not appear in Dr. Johnson’s Dictionary or any publication for 
nearly another century, or simply jettison these misleading 
neologisms, which would be the proper thing to do. Perhaps they 
can meet this burden, but that is the point: dealing with the actual 
language of the Constitution—“among”—imposes a greater 
burden of proof and explanation on the protagonist of a narrow 
meaning than dealing with “interstate commerce.” 
But once it is believed and accepted that “interstate 
commerce” and “intrastate” are the actual language of the 
Constitution, or its precise embodiment, which belief seems to 
have been widespread for well over a century, there is no easy 
defense against the “between” meaning of “interstate.” This is 
because “interstate” by definition really does mean “between the 
states,” and the burden of proof then shifts to those arguing for a 
broader meaning of “interstate” than “between” states, and in 
turn this (usually) helps justify conservative arguments about an 
overreaching Court and federal power generally. Thus the Court’s 
virtual abandonment of the original language of the Constitution 
in favor of appealingly straight-forward though totally ersatz 
language, besides being anachronistic and misleading (and just 
plain wrong, in our opinion), also improperly shifts the initial 
burden of proof to those propounding the broader, “inside” 
meaning of the power over commerce among the states. 
Second, the “interstate commerce power” as currently 
extended inside states is vulnerable to attack, in part-as shown in 
Lopez—because to reach much “intrastate” activity it requires a 
considerable extension of the “interstate commerce” power by 
means of commerce-extending doctrines often based on the 
necessary and proper clause. 
 
 170. See supra pp. 469–82 and notes 14 and 168, and infra pp. 492 and 495–96.  
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For example, Wickard’s “aggregation” test, often cited (and 
criticized) as the high-water mark of the Court’s extension of the 
“interstate commerce power,” was presumably based on the 
necessary and proper clause supplementing “the interstate 
commerce” power. Thus, if measured geographically, the starting 
point for application of the necessary and proper clause to 
Filburn’s wheat would have been the “interstate” line—the 
Indiana-Ohio border—and the physical distance that the 
necessary and proper clause would have had to cover would have 
been the distance from that line to the billions of wheat kernels 
on Filburn’s farm in Montgomery County, likely several miles 
inside the state. This is also a considerable conceptual distance for 
those who argue that the broad extension of the commerce power 
especially since 1937 is a danger to liberty and federalism.171 But 
if we assume that Filburn planted, grew and harvested all of his 
wheat together, mingling the wheat ultimately to be kept at home 
with that to be sold, and only separating out after harvest the 
wheat for truly “personal”172 use from that for sale, for his cattle, 
for his poultry, and for next year’s seed, then if the federal power 
were defined as the power over intercourse or transactions 
mingled with the states and that affect more states than one, it 
could more readily be concluded that the entire process was 
commerce among the states from the spring day Filburn first 
sowed the wheat, and certainly at and past the time of harvest. At 
most, the necessary and proper clause would have come into play 
in the form of “affecting commerce” only to cover the microscopic 
distance between one kernel of wheat on a stalk or in a container 
that would end up in “personal” use and the adjoining kernel in a 
container destined for the wider market, or to replace the market, 
and not to reach over the miles of distance from a kernel on his 
 
 171. HOLLIS-BRUSKY, supra note 115, 93–103 (reviewing conservative and Federalist 
Society critiques of expansive comerce power based on Wickard and other decisions). But 
as to the degree that states should be independent economic units, see James Madison, 
Vices of the Political System of the United States (1787), reprinted in 1 THE FOUNDERS 
CONSTITUTION 348–57 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds. 1987) (complaining 
bitterly about states as a danger to liberty, especially economic liberty). For a modern view 
of states as lesser, though still significant, barriers to broader trade see Conrad J. Weiler, 
Jr., The United States of America, in INTERNAL MARKETS AND MULTI-LEVEL 
GOVERNANCE 160–95 (George Anderson, ed., 2012) [hereinafter Weiler, United]. 
 172. See discussion supra pp. 469–70. 
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farm that potentially affected transactions at the state border to 
the actual “interstate” border.173 
Thus, “interstate” as the starting point for applying the 
necessary and proper clause is a considerably more remote 
starting point from the “local, non-commercial” activity that was 
some portion of Filburn’s farming than if the commerce being 
affected was already inside his farm, i.e., among the states and 
mingled with the wheat kernels being grown on the farm which 
was part of a national market in wheat inside and affecting more 
states than one. In turn, the justification for and reach of the 
application of the “affecting commerce” test or some other 
formula under the necessary and proper clause must usually be 
far more extended under the “interstate commerce” 
conceptualization than under the “inside states” or “intermingled 
with” conceptualization of “among.” In the latter case the 
necessary and proper clause might not need to be extended nearly 
as far, or perhaps not be invoked at all. Similarly, “intrastate” is 
far broader, more all-encompassing and exclusive of “interstate 
commerce” activity inside states right up to the state or interstate 
line than mingled commercial and noncommercial activity inside 
states that might also be commerce among the several states. 
In other words, as a matter of “original principles,” is the 
starting point for the application of the federal power over 
commerce “among the several states” a point along the 
“interstate” framework of the “mathematical lines” of the 
boundaries of the states which Marshall rejected in Gibbons, and 
which textually is all there is when seen in the context of the 
“interstate-intrastate” distinction, or, is the starting point for the 
regulation of commerce the actual commercial intercourse and 
intermingling that exists inside more states than one, as well as 
between states? This might also be relevant to the question raised 
in Lopez174 and reemphasized in Morrison175 as to whether there 
is a “jurisdictional element” connecting the activity to be 
regulated to “interstate commerce.” If the jurisdictional element 
must connect to “interstate commerce,” i.e., crossing a state 
boundary, that might exclude some activities inside a state 
 
 173. To be sure, this analysis might not end the argument that this might still be too 
much federal power, but it does arguably reduce the amount of federal “overreach” that 
is being disputed. 
 174. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552–53 (1995). 
 175. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000).  
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altogether and require a greater reach of the jurisdictional 
element than one connecting activity already inside a state to 
commerce among the several states.176 
The relevance of all this rests in part on the fact that two 
justices who were also in the Lopez majority explicitly criticized 
parts of doctrines extending the “interstate commerce power” 
inside states. The first, the late Justice Scalia, concurring in 
Gonzalez v. Raich said that the “substantially affecting interstate 
commerce” test is “misleading” because “activities that 
substantially affect interstate commerce are not themselves part of 
interstate commerce,” and thus the power to regulate them comes 
from the necessary and proper clause.177 Scalia was arguing 
correctly as a textual matter (but from our viewpoint also 
irrelevantly and unoriginally) that those activities that 
substantially affect “interstate commerce” are not themselves 
interstate commerce, presumably because they are “intrastate.”178 
But again, our point is that many commercial activities that 
are inside a state —”intrastate”— and that are thus textually not 
“interstate commerce” might nonetheless actually still be 
“commerce among the several states,” i.e., inside more states than 
one.179 Consequently, as a textual matter, some “intrastate” 
commerce might not qualify as the commerce that can be 
regulated without the assistance of the necessary and proper 
clause, or perhaps at all, yet it might readily be regulated as a 
 
 176. Obviously reaching inside states raises federalism issues, but while federalism is 
important, the explicit power in the Constitution is to “regulate Commerce . . . among the 
several states,” not to protect a rigid version of federalism despite the fact that evolving 
commerce among the several states over the years increasingly absorbs once “local” or 
“oeconomic” activities. See Weiler, Explaining, supra note 107 and Weiler, United, supra 
note 171.  
 177. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 34 (2005) (emphasis added).  
 178. We think that Raich’s growing of marijuana solely for her own medicinal use was 
“oeconomy,” the kind of gainful and productive but non-market household activity that 
was not understood by the Framers to be commerce, but since has otherwise generally 
been largely absorbed by the modern market “economy.” This distinction was well-known 
at the Framing and provides an originalist basis for distinguishing what is “commerce” and 
what is not, as opposed to the artificial and anachronistic “interstate-intrastate” distinction. 
See Weiler, Explaining, supra note 107, at 173–76. Interestingly, the originalist-textualist 
Justice Scalia relied on “interstate commerce,” while Justice Holmes, the legal realist, did 
not. See supra pp. 460–61 and note 149. 
 179. A possibility recognized by Balkin, though by another mode of reasoning, 
BALKIN, supra note 4, at 160; see also Nelson & Pushaw, supra note 150 and accompanying 
text, among others. 
4 - WEILER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/11/19 6:28 PM 
394 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 34:429 
 
textual and original matter as commerce “among the several 
states” with no or little further assistance needed. 
This difference in language is important also because even if 
the necessary and proper clause can and clearly has extended the 
reach of the power over commerce, the Court also can and has set 
limits on it. In his majority opinion in the Obamacare case,180 
Chief Justice Roberts specifically noted that the “proper” part of 
the necessary and proper clause sets limits on the use of the 
power.181 Other cases and commentators have also noted that 
there are limits on the necessary and proper clause, including 
those described in McCulloch.182 Thus if the “affecting interstate 
commerce” test is based upon the necessary and proper clause, in 
general it could be cut back again, as it was in Lopez, for 
exceeding the limits of that clause, much more readily than if the 
power over commerce among the states were construed as we 
argue the Framers and Marshall understood it. In the latter case, 
in general the same activity could possibly be regulated without 
resort to the necessary and proper clause at all, simply as 
commerce among the several states, and thus not suffer the risk 
of exceeding the Court’s limitations on the necessary and proper 
clause, or at least be exercised with a more modest use of the 
necessary and proper clause less subject to constitutional 
criticism. 
As noted above,183 the other Lopez Justice, Thomas, rejected 
the “affecting interstate commerce” test outright as not being part 
of the original understanding, and suggested that if they had 
understood “affecting interstate commerce” to be part of the 
Constitution, the Framers would have said so.184 But besides 
anachronistically arguing that the Framers could have used a term 
that would not be invented for another half-century at least, and 
begging the question of whether “among the several states” in fact 
 
 180. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012). 
 181. Id. at 558–61. See also Original Meaning, supra note 14, at 146–47. 
 182. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 420–21. See also Epstein, supra note 77, at 
1397–99. Even the liberal Professor Tribe holds that the clause can not be used to regulate 
anything with any kind of connection to the delegated powers, but must have a closer 
relationship. TRIBE, supra note 156, 801–02. 
 183. Supra p. 474. 
 184. Under what Balkin has described as Thomas’s narrow “trade” theory of the 
commerce power, the necessary and proper clause is probably needed to regulate nontrade 
or noneconomic activity that affects trade or economic activity. BALKIN, supra note 4, at 
151, 177. 
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meant “interstate,” this also undercuts Thomas’s own argument 
because the fact of the absence of “interstate commerce” or, the 
historically available words, “between the states” from the 
Constitution implies that they were not understood as its meaning 
either.185 It is also not clear whether in rejecting the “affecting 
commerce” part of the test Thomas was also rejecting any use of 
the necessary and proper clause to extend the commerce power, 
which would raise additional issues, or just this particular 
application. 
But to take Thomas’s point seriously for a moment, if 
“interstate” and “intrastate” had been invented as words before 
1787, instead of many decades later, and despite the fact that the 
Framers did not use the equivalent and available term “between,” 
and if the Framers nonetheless chose to write “interstate 
commerce” into the Constitution, and if they had left it at that, 
then Thomas would be right and clearly the power would have 
been narrower than we argue is its meaning. But it is also very 
possible that, in the unlikely event that the Framers had used 
those words, they would also have added additional language 
about going inside states for national purposes that would have 
been very much like the language Marshall used in Gibbons: “that 
commerce that affects more states than one” or the language of 
the Virginia Plan. 
After all, as Stern, Kmiec, Balkin and others have noted, the 
Virginia Plan adopted by the Convention proposed to give the 
federal government all the powers needed “to which the states 
were separately incompetent.” That language sounds a lot closer 
to “that commerce that concerns more states than one” or 
“among the several states,” than it is to “interstate commerce.”186 
It is also clear that going into the Convention a prime concern was 
not only with eliminating state barriers to a national market, but 
also state oppression of liberty, especially commercial, both inside 
states and at their borders.187 This is not to ignore the various 
compromises and needs that led away from some of the broad 
powers proposed by the Virginia Plan. But it does show that the 
Framers contemplated quite broad national powers that arguably 
 
 185. See supra p. 436 and note 13 for more discussion. 
 186. Virginia Plan (1787), 1 THE FOUNDERS CONSTITUTION 20–22 (Philip B. Kurland 
& Ralph Lerner eds. 1987); Stern, supra note 126, at 1338–44; Kmiec, supra note 154, at 
548, 561–66, 571–75; and BALKIN, supra note 4, at 143–49, among others.  
 187. See Madison, Vices, supra note 171.  
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reached inside states, so that it is not at all clear that even if the 
Framers could have adopted “interstate,” they would have limited 
the statement of the power in the Constitution over commerce to 
that alone, or not added additional language about going inside 
states. 
In any event, our point is that if more justices were to adopt 
Scalia’s or Thomas’s views we would have a greatly diminished 
power over commerce based in part on an anachronistic and 
arguably narrower replacement of the original English language 
in which the Constitution was written. Our point here is not in the 
first instance whether this would be good or bad, though we think 
the latter, or to naively assume that a conservative Court could 
not find other ways to limit the power over commerce, but simply 
to note that in theory, at least, any given extension of the power 
over commerce among the several states via the affecting 
commerce test, or the necessary and proper clause, would usually 
be less in extent and hence more defensible than an extension of 
“interstate commerce” to the same activity via the same means. 
Third, the “interstate-intrastate” dichotomy implicitly favors 
state over federal power in a way that “among the several states” 
does not. As noted above, the “interstate” framework by 
definition leaves vast areas and activities of the country to state 
regulation, presumptively anything inside states, and generally 
requires help from the necessary and proper clause to reach inside 
states. But in addition to this inherent pro-state power bias 
implicit in the interstate framework, the Court also often adds 
additional federalism protections to its exercise of the power over 
commerce among the states.188 Yet arguably, as noted above,189 
the purpose of the power to regulate commerce among, i.e., 
inside, the several, i.e., more than one, states, was to overcome 
state restrictions and regulate national commerce that was inside 
more than one states, and not to regulate only commerce crossing 
state borders. The characterization of the constitutional power as 
one to regulate “interstate commerce” with additional Tenth 
Amendment or other federalism protections thrown in is thus a 
double protection for federalism contained within the gloss on the 
 
 188. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552, 564–68 (1995). 
 189. Supra pp. 432–36 and 495–96 and accompanying notes and notes 171, 173, 176, 
and 178. 
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language of a power one of whose significant purposes was to 
overcome state commercial protectionism and barriers.190 
Fourth, for all its linguistic appeal, the textual simplicity and 
almost total dominance of “interstate commerce” in 
constitutional discourse ironically creates an arguably more 
complicated and confusing way of applying the power over 
commerce among the several states than might be needed under 
the “inside” interpretation of “among the several states.” This is 
first because “interstate” actually does only mean “between 
states” or “crossing state boundaries,” meanings that, especially 
when paired with “intrastate,” as is so frequently done, literally 
exclude reaching inside a state unaided. Thus, because of this 
literal meaning of “interstate,” in order to reach inside states over 
the “intrastate” barrier, as discussed above,191 the Court has 
developed several doctrines to extend the “interstate commerce 
power” inside states. This in turn justifies opposition by those 
opposed to such extensions of power, but also confuses the public 
at large more generally over seemingly overly broad and varying 
interpretations of the federal power over commerce in order to 
reach inside states. 192 As just discussed, this might not be the case, 
or be the case less, if the Court stayed with the actual original 
American English of the Constitution, which arguably already 
meant to go inside states. 
In addition, whether or not “among the states” can be proved 
to mean “interstate” or “between the states,” those claiming to be 
originalist-textualists, like Justice Scalia, or originalists, like 
Justice Thomas, undermine the credibility of their own 
methodology by working with anachronistic, ersatz language 
rather than the actual language of the Constitution. 
Finally, the rapid and seemingly unquestioned rise of 
“interstate commerce” calls into question the viability of Justice 
 
 190. This is not to disparage the importance of federalism, but only to keep it from 
gaining an extra advantage by means of a gloss on the Constitutional language. 
 191. Supra Part IV.B and IV.C. 
 192. Among many examples that could be given, see Intrastate Commerce Act, 
TENTH AMENDMENT CENTER (last accessed Jan 26, 2019), 
https://tenthamendmentcenter.com/legislation/intrastate-commerce-act/. Called 
“legislation to nullify federal overreach into virtually everything through a distortion of 
the “‘Interstate Commerce Clause,’” (emphasis added), the act “provides that ‘[a]ll goods 
grown, manufactured or made in (STATE) and all services, performed in (STATE), when 
such goods or services are sold, maintained, or retained in (STATE), shall not be subject 
to the authority of the Congress of the United States’[.]”  
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Scalia’s often made point that the Constitution should not be 
amended by “activist”—usually meaning liberal—judges, but only 
through the Article V amendment process.193 To the extent that 
the replacement of “commerce among the several states” by 
“interstate commerce” makes a difference in the interpretation of 
the Constitution, which we argue it does, then the Constitution 
was amended seamlessly and silently in the 1870’s and 1880’s with 
almost no one noticing or objecting then or since, certainly not 
among many of those most eagerly propounding “originalist” and 
“textualist” interpretation. To be sure, publicly proposing 
constitutional changes and putting them on hold while they are 
debated and then put up for amendment may be the way 
constitutional changes should happen, and may be practical in 
situations where there is an overt debate over constitutional 
text.194 But when language itself quickly and quietly changes, as is 
often the case and is apparently the case here, Scalia’s approach 
is quite unrealistic. The United States does not have an Académie 
Française analogue for policing the American variety of the 
English language; consequently, who has the responsibility or 
ability to vigilantly monitor whether a linguistic or semantic 
change is being made in the language used to characterize the 
meaning and text of the Constitution and then to call a time-out 
in that change so that an amendment to the Constitution could be 
considered is quite unclear. Moreover, as this study illustrates, the 
pace of linguistic change is often so fast that by the time a 
constitutional challenge could be made, the Court and the public 
may already have adapted to the new words or meanings and 
perceive no difficulty with the changed language.195 
 
 193. Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, in JUDGES ON JUDGING: VIEWS 
FROM THE BENCH 192 (David M. O’Brien ed., 1997). Scalia probably never expected this 
argument to apply to conservatives. 
 194. Though it is not clear how the Court would suggest that an amendment be 
considered. 
 195. Despite Justice Scalia’s criticism of “living constitutionalists” for not changing 
constitutional meaning through Article V, the conservative legal movement, of which 
Scalia was a central part, does not seem to focus on Article V either. Instead, the 
movement has long focused on changing constitutional meaning through developing 
conservative scholarship, education, networking, vetting candidates for the bench, and 
other means, with little or no observed attention to change through constitutional 
amendments. Hollis-Brusky, for example, concludes that “the Federalist Society network 
has both (1) shaped the content, direction, and character of constitutional revolutions by 
supporting, developing and diffusing intellectual capital to Supreme Court decision-
makers; and (2) helped foster the conditions that facilitate those constitutional revolutions 
in the first place by (a) identifying, credentialing, and getting the right kinds of judges and 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The Constitution says that Congress “shall have power . . . to 
regulate commerce among the several states.” It does not say 
Congress “shall have power . . . to regulate ‘interstate 
commerce.’” Despite this, the actual language of the Constitution, 
“commerce among the several states,” long ago disappeared as 
the working language of the Court, the legal academy and 
apparently of Congress and the public at large—including most 
textualists and originalists—and has long performed little more 
than a symbolic function, if that.196 In its place, the term 
“interstate commerce” (often complemented by “intrastate”) 
long ago came to be accepted as a working substitute for and as 
the equivalent of the actual words and meaning of the 
Constitution. Because “interstate commerce” arguably has a 
narrower “between” meaning than the broader “inside” meaning 
of the original language of the Constitution, “among,” the 
 
Justices on the bench, (b) acting as a vocal and respected judicial audience to keep those 
judges and Justices in check once on the bench, and (c) creating an intellectual and political 
climate that is favorable to the desired change by reducing the stigma associated with once-
radical ideas or constitutional theories.” But nothing on constitutional amendments. 
HOLLIS-BRUSKY, supra note 115, at 7, 152–64. Steven M. Teles also observed nothing 
about the constitutional amendment process. Instead, he tells the very political tale of how 
“[c]onservatives slowly recognized that they needed to develop their own apparatus for 
legal change, one that could challenge legal liberalism in the courts, in classrooms, and in 
legal culture.” STEVEN M. TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT, 
57 (2008). See also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, THE 
CONSTITUTION IN THE YEAR 2000: CHOICES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 
(1988) generated under the supervision of Attorney General Ed Meese as a guide, not to 
amending the Constitution through Article V, but to changing the meaning of the 
constitution in fifteen areas important to conservatives through careful selection of judicial 
nominees.  
 196. Obviously glosses on constitutional meaning are unavoidable. For example, 
Jefferson’s “wall of separation between church and state” is a gloss on the Establishment 
Clause of the First Amendment. To be sure, the “wall” gloss has pulled jurisprudence as 
well as public understanding of what “an establishment of religion” actually means toward 
the meaning of the gloss. But at least most scholars and judges are well aware of the 
difference between the gloss and the actual language of the clause and the influence the 
gloss has had: “[t]he difference between the Constitution’s phrase and Jefferson’s is 
significant because Jefferson’s has tended to mean so much more.” PHILIP HAMBURGER, 
SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 2 (2002). See also Christopher A. Boyko, A New 
Originalism: Adoption of a Grammatical-Interpretive Approach to Establishment Clause 
Jurisprudence After District of Columbia v. Heller, 57 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 703, 706-708 
(2009). Boyko refers to creation of “supertext,” non-constitutional language that supplants 
the Constitutional language. See generally DANIEL L. DREISBACH, THOMAS JEFFERSON 
AND THE WALL OF SEPARATION BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE (2002). We cite these 
works not for their substance, but for the point that in this area there is widespread 
recognition of the difference between the Constitution and its gloss.  
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reliance on “interstate commerce” has both arisen from and 
contributed to a narrower understanding of what the power in the 
Constitution actually provides than might be justified under the 
actual language of the constitution. Moreover, the widespread 
acceptance of “interstate commerce” as the equivalent of if not 
the actual language of the Constitution has privileged this narrow 
understanding. In consequence, to meet many challenges over the 
years that Congress and the Court felt required reaching inside 
states, the “interstate doctrine” has been supplemented by a 
number of corollary doctrines that extend its reach, such as the 
“substantially affecting commerce” test and reliance on the 
necessary and proper clause. Because these compensatory 
doctrines are contested and contestable in themselves, they make 
extensions of the “interstate commerce” power less certain and 
contribute to or at least reinforce a perception as well as an 
argument in some quarters that the Court is overreaching and has 
ignored the Constitution. Moreover, these extending doctrines 
might not be as necessary or even be necessary at all under what 
we would argue is the correct original understanding of 
“commerce among the several states.” 
Thus we are presented with the oddity—especially in the face 
of the recent rise if not dominance of originalist approaches to 
interpreting the Constitution—that neologisms invented decades 
after the adoption of the Constitution and certainly totally 
unknown to the Framers have largely become the primary terms 
to express and analyze the Framers’ language as well as to shape 
our understanding of the meaning of their language, both on and 
off the Court, and even among most originalists, in applying one 
of the most important powers in the Constitution, and one for 
which ironically the Constitution was originally created. For all 
practical purposes, the power “to regulate commerce among the 
several states” has become “the interstate commerce power,” 
with its narrow connotations, not only on the Court, but in the 
academy and the public at large. 
